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deficit estimate for off-budget items, state and local deficits or surpluses,
deviations from high employment, price effects, and two types of capital
accounting. Unlike previous analyses of these changes, I include
adjustments to the state and local budgets for cyclical factors, using newly-
available estimates, to estimate a total-government structural deficit (and
variants thereof).
My analysis shows that, in theory, at most two deficit measures
(price-adjusted high employment deficits and capitalized price-adjusted
high employment deficits, both for the total government sector) are
necessary and sufficient to assess the potential benefits and harms of fiscal
deficits.
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than are some of the cruder deficit measures in providing significant
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reached its current fevered pitch, many economists were aware of some
rather dramatic shortcomings in the debt and deficit data, as compiled and
published in federal budget documents and in the National Income and
Product Accounts (NIPA). Led largely by Eisner and Pieper (their seminal
work in this regard is [1984]), it is now generally agreed that the reported
fiscal deficit is not merely inaccurate in the usual senses that data are open
to question (incomplete samples, transcription errors, etc.), but it is
fundamentally incorrect as a meaningful reflection of the economic activity
of the United States government sector.
The recognition of this problem set off an effort to define an
appropriate measure (or, perhaps, more than one appropriate measure> of
the fiscal actions of a government over a given time period. Naturally, not
everyone agrees about the appropriate changes, perhaps largely because
the various proposals each have implications for policy which are or are not
agreeable to a particular investigator. In the face of professional
disagreement over the appropriate changes to be made, the tendency to
“default” to using the traditional measures, while understandable, is
indeed unfortunate. For, while each of the alternatives may be open to
question and attack, it may not be too bold to suggest that virtually any of the
alternatives would be qualitatively better than the measure currently used.
page 1(Which measures are quantitatively more useful is, of course, the subject of
the empirical work of this paper.)
This paper will test several of the proposed alternatives which have
been proposed for measuring the deficit, as part of the larger effort to make
it possible for the economics profession to converge on a consensus. This
investigation, therefore, will attempt to begin to answer two related
questions. First, what is the most useful measurement (or measurements)
of the government sector’s fiscal deficit in theory, from the standpoint of
capturing both the potential benefits1 and the possible damage done to the
economy by deficit spending? Second, does the theoretically-preferred
deficit measure dominate other deficit measures empirically?
One key difference between this analysis and others is the inclusion
of four measures of the “structural” deficit which include state and local
governments together with the federal government in a total-government
measure. This is based on estimates of structural deficits for the state and
local sector by Kusko and Rubin [1993]. Including these measures allows
me to assess the empirical significance of federal-only versus total-
government deficit measures in time-series analyses.
The main empirical conclusion that I reach is that “better” deficit
1 The temptation to heed Benjamin Franklin’s dictum (“Neither a borrower
nor a lender be.“) when analyzing government borrowing causes many casual observers
(and even some careful analysts) to condemn debt as if it were, in every case, immoral.
The facts that virtually everyone who owns a house does so by going into debt, and that an
increase in business debt is considered a positive leading economic indicator, however,
shows that few people really believe that debt is inherently bad. However, it is often
asserted to be so for governments.
page 2measures do not necessarily improve the econometric results provided by
cruder measures in some basic macroeconomic relationships. While it is
true that Eisner and Pieper’s suggested federal-only Price-Adjusted High-
Employment Deficit is more statistically significant than other measures in
a plurality of the tests performed, this plurality is not even a strict majority;
and including the state and local sector in this definition of the deficit
makes the statistical results much worse rather than better.
In several instances, in fact, the more-refined measures perform
significantly worse than some of the cruder measures as independent
variables in explaining key macroeconomic performance indicators.
Further, the total-government measures generally perform worse than
federal-only measures, no matter what level of sophistication one uses in
defining the deficit.
This should not, however, be viewed as an argument against the
usefulness of the search for a superior measure of the fiscal deficit. It
merely means that the various improvements under investigation do not
possess a desirable “extra” benefit; that is, if one had developed a measure
of the deficit which arguably conveyed the government sector’s fiscal
situation better than do other measures, it would be advantageous if it also
dominated all others in time-series studies. Where that extra benefit is
lacking, however, the improvement is no less of an improvement.
Specifically, if one is looking to the deficit as a way of knowing if the “budget
is balanced,” the empirical results below do not speak to the relative
usefulness of the different measures. Since each measure gives a different
estimate of the level of the current deficit, that central issue remains as
crucial as ever.
It should be noted, moreover, that the two most commonly-quoted
page 3measures of the deficit, technically known as the On-Budget Deficit and the
Unified Federal Deficit, do not provide strong statistical results in any
systematic way in the tests reported below. Thus, while one can argue
about which should be the preferred measure, there is little doubt that the
numbers over which members of Congress are currently obsessing are of
very little value.
In the next (second) section of this paper, I will discuss both the
(relatively) non-controversial corrections that must be made to the data to
improve their use value and the more controversial alterations which have
been proposed for the deficit accounts. I will build a menu of different
deficit measures, starting from the most basic and adding various
adjustments to create more sophisticated deficit measures. This will, by its
nature, entail a useful review of the established theory in this area of
macroeconomics. Section Three will review in detail the menu of potential
benefits and harms of deficits as a vehicle to analyze the potential uses to
which the various deficit measures can be put.
Section Four presents results of a set of time-series regressions,
testing each of the possible definitions of the fiscal deficit in its explanatory
power as an exogenous variable for each of a set of macroeconomic target
variables. Finally, Section Five discusses some conclusions.
The ability of Congress to define what is and is not a deficit is
somewhat like the ability of the fabled king who decreed that the value of  n:
should be set at exactly three. What we insist on believing to be true and
what is actually true are sometimes different, and the more we use
page 4incorrect measures of deficits, the more obvious this becomes.
I I
Full Name
1. On-Budget Nominal Federal Budget basis accounting
Deficit
2 2. UDF Unified Deficit-Federal
3. UDT Unified Deficit-Total Federal plus State/Local deficit
Government (surplus), NIPA basis accounting
4. DDGDPF Change in nominal Debt-to- Negative of Government Net
nominal GDP ratio, federal Financial Assets-Federal
nominal GDP ratio, Government Net Financial Assets-
including federal, state, and State and Local
7.
8.
Deficit-Federal estimated if unemployment were at
the NAIRU rate
HEDT High Employment Nominal UDT, estimated if unemployment
Deficit-Total Government were at the NAIRU rate
PAHEDF Price Adjusted High HEDF adjusted for price effects on
Employment Deficit- outstanding federal debt
Employment Deficit-Total outstanding government debt
Government
10. KPAHEDF Capitalized Price Adjusted PAHEDF, reduced by net federal
High Employment Deficit investments in: durables, structures,
Federal education, natural resources, and
labor training and services
11. KPAHEDT Capitalized Price Adjusted
High Employment Deficit investments in: durables, structures,
Total Government education, natural resources, and
labor training and services
12. KLPAHEDF Capitalized (with Liabilities) KPAHEDF plus unfunded liabilities




of the Social Security OASDI trust
fund (Open Group)
A. Basic Adjustments
Table 1 summarizes the thirteen alternative measures of the U.S.
fiscal deficit to be compared in this analysis. While it is impossible to
page 5imagine any proposed adjustment to the measurement of debt and deficits
that is non-controversial, there are several adjustments to “the deficit” that
are fairly commonly accepted, at least among economists.
As a starting point, the official On-Budget Deficit can be used as a
standard of comparison. For the purposes of measuring the government’s
fiscal impact on an economy, however, the deficit should include both on-
budget and off-budget items. 2 Since the off-budget accounts are currently
running surpluses (due to the surpluses in the Social Security System), the
total deficit is less than the on-budget deficit alone.3 In 1993, the On-Budget
2 Under federal law, any spending bill can specify spending and revenues
as being on- or off-budget. There is no immutable general principle which applies to all
off-budget items, since it is political agreement that creates the distinction. For example,
the outlays for “Commerce and Housing Credit” were separated into on- and off-budget
outlays beginning in 1989, for no apparent economic reason; but this accounts for a tiny
fraction of off-budget spending. The vast majority of off-budget receipts and outlays are
due to the Social Security system. In 1993, of the $295.4 billion in off-budget outlays, there
were $3.3 billion in Commerce and Housing Credit outlays, $330.5 billion in off-budget
Social Security outlays, negative $31.7 billion in off-budget net interest outlays, and
negative $6.8 billion in off-budget Undistributed Offsetting Receipts. Similarly, all of the
$355.2 billion in off-budget receipts were from Social Insurance Taxes and Contributions.




therefore, more than the entire off-budget surplus is due to the Social
this adjustment seems obvious enough from a theoretical standpoint,
and was in fact instituted by the federal government some years ago in reporting deficits,
it was a misunderstanding of this issue which (paradoxically) led to the defeat of the
page 6Nominal Deficit (OBD, deficit measure #l in Table 1) was $300.0 billion (or
4.8% of nominal GDP) while the off-budget surplus was $45.3 billion, for a
Unified Deficit-Federal (UDF, deficit measure #2) of $254.7 billion (or 4.1%
of nominal GDP).
In addition, state and local governments’ accounts can be included in
a Unified Deficit-Total Government (UDT, deficit measure #3, which
includes both on-budget and off-budget federal items along with all state
and local items). In 1993, UDT was $244.2 billion (or 3.9% of nominal GDP),
although this is not directly comparable to UDF, since UDF is calculated
using budget-basis
accounting basis.4
accounting while UDT is reported on a NIPA
Balanced Budget Amendment in February of 1995. Several Senators, based on their stated
fear that “raiding” the Social Security surplus to finance current deficits is unfair to the
young, wanted the amendment to require that the On-Budget deficit be balanced by 2002.
This puts in perspective the dangers of considering any change non-controversial.
4 That is, subtracting UDF from UDT will not derive the state and local
surplus or deficit, even though that method would work if both measures were on the same
accounting basis. NIPA deficits differ from budget-based deficits in several key respects,
most notably (in recent years) the exclusion from the NIPA calculations of outlays for
deposit insurance, as well as smaller items like geographic differences (Puerto Rico and
the US. Virgin Islands being excluded from the NIPA accounts, for example). See
Congressional Budget Office 11994bl.
For the purposes of the empirical relationships to be analyzed below, the  NIPA basis
is the more appropriate measure of economic activity [see Congressional Budget Office,
1994b, for an argument to this effect]; but OBD and UDF are included in these analyses due
page 7There is a theoretical reason as well as a practical reason for
including non-federal government accounts when measuring the deficit.
The theoretical reason is that the effect of “the government” on an economy
is not a function of the level of the government that makes the expenditure.
A dollar spent is a dollar spent, and a dollar borrowed is a dollar borrowed,
no matter which governmental unit spends or borrows it. The practical
reason is that excluding state and local government finances from the
deficit calculations has caused Congress and successive Presidents to shift
financing responsibilities for various programs downward, meaning that
“the government” is still doing what it was doing-but a different financial
official is signing the check.5 Perhaps because of this, the adjustment in
1993 for state and local deficits was minuscule: a $2.1 billion surplus in
1993, although it had been in surplus by as much as $58.1 billion in 1984.6
to their more common usage and as a baseline against which to measure the more
carefully estimated deficits.
5 Actually, the practical impact of this has been to reduce total government
spending without specifically voting for the cuts. Since states and localities are much
more prone to losing their tax bases than is the federal government, they have not been able
to raise the revenues necessary to fund both old and newly-imposed programs. The
resulting cuts in non-federally-mandated programs might be an appealing result to some,
but it is a surreptitious method of enacting budget cuts at best and unpredictable in its
ultimate quantitative impact at worst. The recently enacted ban against “unfunded
mandates,” if it works in the way it sponsors intend, will limit this.
6 The picture is also distorted by the substantial amount of grants-in-aid
from the federal government to state and local governments, which amounted to $181
page 8a Changes in Debt as a Measure of Deficits
Conceptually, the deficit should equal the change in debt for the year;
and deficit/GDP should equal AdebtiGDP.  Attempting to derive deficits in
that way, however, highlights a problem that is not obvious in the deficit
numbers alone. Specifically, there are a number of different series that
could be called “the debt.” The Economic Report of-the President [Council of
Economic Advisors, 19941 provides a large variety of series relevant to this
issue: “Gross Federal Debt-Total” and “Gross Federal Debt-Held by the
Public” (both in Table B-77), the amount of the gross federal debt held by the
public that is actually held by the Federal Reserve (Table B-78), “Interest-
Bearing Public Debt Securities”-both marketable and non-marketable
(Table B-851, “Mar e a e n erest-Bearing Public Debt Securities Held by k t bl I t
Private Investors” (Table B-861, “Public Debt Securities Held by Private
Investors,” and the state and local government ownership thereof (Table B-
87). None of these series is equal to any of the others, and all are different
from “Government Net Financial Assets” (Table B-112).
The difference between the Gross Federal Debt-Total and Gross
Federal Debt-Held by the Public is the many securities held by federal
agencies ($1.4 trillion of a total $4.3 trillion in 1993, for example). Since the
amount of debt held among federal agencies is more an accounting
convention than a measure of the drainage of funds from capital markets,
billion in the 1993 fiscal year. This creates the potential for the federal government to
“solve” a large percentage of its deficit problem by cutting off such funds to the states-a
move which would create chaos, to be sure, but which is tempting if one is merely worried
about the level of the federal deficit.
page 9it would make sense to look at the publicly-held debt only. Much of this,
however, is actually held by state and local governments (which are
included among “private investors” in the data). Subtracting those from the
debt, the remaining series would include only those securities held by the
American public, U.S. corporations, and foreign entities.7
However, the exercise at hand is designed to test whether close
substitutes to the Eisner and Pieper calculations can be found in changing
debt-to-GDP ratios. Therefore, rather than creating an entirely new family
of debt adjustments, and in order to be consistent with Eisner and Pieper’s
calculations of price effects (described below), the “Government Net
Financial Assets” series are used to define deficit measures #4 and #5,
which are the changes in the nominal debt-to-nominal GDP ratios for the
federal debt only (DDGDPF, which was 2.1% in 1993) and for the total of both
the federal and state/local sectors (DDGDPT; 2.6% in 1993).
C. High-Employment Adjustments
One of the most important adjustments to the deficit measures is the
so-called structural (or cyclically-adjusted) deficit. This hypothetical
measure of what the deficit would be if the economy were at full
employment is, of course, tied to the debate over what is the level of full
employment itself. Estimates of “full” employment range from as low as a
7 Much of the federal debt is held by the Federal Reserve (almost precisely
10% of the Gross Federal Debt Held by the Public in 1993). However, corresponding to the
debt held by the Fed are the monetary obligations of the Fed (the monetary base-Federal
Reserve Notes plus banks’ reserve balances with the Fed), which are assets of the public. If
we are interested in the total ultimate claims of the public on the government, therefore,
there is no need to adjust for the Federal Reserve’s holdings of federal debt.
page 101.6% unemployment rate IVickrey, 19931 to 6.25% [Weiner, 19931, but the
current practice is to use the NAIRU (Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of
Unemployment) level of unemployment as the benchmark for the
structural deficit. The largest plurality for estimating the NAIRU seems to
be between 5.7% and 6.0% [see Weiner, 19931, although the January 1994
change in the labor survey raised questions about that level.8 In any case,
the Bureau of Economic Analysis finessed the question of whether this is
“full employment” by calling their structural deficit a “high-employment”
deficit, rather than a full employment deficit, and the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) calls their structural deficit series the “Standardized-
Employment Deficit.”
For time-series empirical work, however, this debate turns out not to
be important. The variance of the structural deficit series is unaffected by
the choice of a benchmark. One explanation of this [for example,
Congressional Budget Office, 1994al is that Okun’s Law reliably captures
the tradeoff between unemployment and GDP, and further that changes in
GDP are linearly related to changes in revenues and expenditures. This
means that the variation in the deficit does not change no matter which
unemployment rate is used to define full employment. It should be noted,
however, that this useful linearity is almost certain to break down at the
more extreme
target.
estimates of full employment, for example, Vickrey’s 1.6%
8 The Congressional Budget Office [1994bl currently estimates that the new
survey technique requires raising NAIRU estimates by roughly one-fourth of a percentage
point above previous estimates, although they cite evidence that the necessary adjustment
might be as low as 0.1%. In any case, their estimate of the NAIRU is now 6.0%.
page 11The reason to look at the structural deficit, rather than the actual
deficit, is obvious (at least to Keynesians): attempts to balance the actual
budget are likely to be self-defeating. That is, attempts to cut government
spending and increase net tax revenues will decrease GDP (by larger or
smaller amounts, depending on the size of the multipliers), at least in the
short run, which will raise government spending and lower net tax
revenues, re-creating a deficit-albeit a smaller one than before. This
circular process is convergent in most macroeconomic models, so that the
actual deficit can be eliminated in this way, but only at the cost of a
significantly deeper recession.
In this paper, the High-Employment Federal Nominal Deficit (HEDF,
deficit measure #6), is taken from the CBO’s standardized-employment
deficit series [1994a], which uses a non-constant estimate of NAIRU (which
has ranged between 5.0% and 6.0% over the thirty-seven years that it has
been estimated, although it has not been below 5.5% since 1963). In 1993,
HEDF was $215.0 billion, or 3.4% of nominal GDP. The Bureau of Economic
Analysis’s series9 [de Leeuw and Holloway, 1983, and subsequent updates
in the Survey of Current Business], which is based on a 6% definition of full
employment,1° is only available through 1990, because-in the most
9 Although the standardized-employment deficit and the high-employment
deficit use different methodologies, they have moved very similarly over time. The
correlation coefficient between the two over the 1956-1990 period was 0.993, while the
correlation coefficient between annual changes in the two series was 0.939. Hence, for
time series analysis, the substitutability between the series should be quite high.
10 Actually, the derivation of this series is based on “mid-expansion trend”




of ironies-budget cutbacks have prevented the BEA from
the series after the most recent change in the methodologies of the
A structural deficit series has also been estimated for the state and
local sector, by Kusko and Rubin [1993]. Their estimates are based on the
unrevised methodology of the National Income and Product Accounts, but it
at least provides an entry point for estimating the total government sector’s
potential deficit at NAIRU. For 1993, the state and local sector’s structural
deficit was estimated to be -$12.9 billion (i.e., a surplus) which, added to the
HEDF of $215.0 billion, brings the total government structural deficit
(HEDT, deficit measure #7) to $202.1 billion, or 3.2% of nominal GDP.
D. Price Adjustments
An important, and more controversial, series of adjustments
attempts to account for the effect of inflation on the deficit and debt accounts
[see, for example, Eisner, 1991a]. Since inflation (or, perhaps more
accurately, expectations of inflation) is built into the interest rates that
governments pay on their outstanding debts, it is arguably appropriate to
decrease the measured deficit by the so-called “inflation tax,” i.e., the
amount that inflation has increased the debt. With a $4 trillion debt and 3%
inflation, for example, governments have paid $120 billion to their lenders
to prevent their principal from losing real value. This can be subtracted
from the deficit as if it were tax revenue, since it represents the decrease
the real amount of debt owed by the government to its bond-holders.
in
unemployment rate. It is not, therefore, a direct attempt to estimate the changes in the
deficit due to changes in unemployment rates, but arrives at such conclusions indirectly.
page 13Of course, a deficit is a flow of indebtedness incurred throughout the
course of a year. Eisner and Pieper [1988 and 1991, for example] construct a
method to account for this, and (with D equal to net federal debt at market
value) use the following equation to compute Price Effects (PE), with the




(1) PE = pet-1
l)Dt-1 + (F-NDt - Dt-1)
pet
pt
Looking at this piece-by-piece, it is actually two separate adjustments: the
first adjusts previously accumulated debt for the percentage increase in
prices from the end of the previous year to the end of the current year; and
the second part adjusts this year’s increase in debt (which is the deficit,
assuming away all of the accounting differences) for the percentage change
in prices from the middle of the year to the end of the year. Both parts are
then divided by the simple ratio of the end-of-period price to the average
price,12 with the two results summed. The result is a dollar value which is
then subtracted from the deficit to produce the Price Adjusted High
Employment Deficit.
However, Eisner has recently been using a simpler method for
measuring price effects [for example, 1994a, and Eisner and Pieper, 19921.
Multiplying net federal debt13 by the percentage change in the implicit GDP
11 The end-of-period price level is calculated as the average of the values of the
fourth quarter implicit GDP deflator and the next year’s first quarter deflator. In symbols,
this becomes: Pet =
Pt(QIV) + Pt+l(QI)
2 ’ where Q stands for quarter.
12 This converts the sum into a real value based on the mid-year prices.
13 These analyses use Net Federal Debt at market value, a series of their own
page 14deflator and subtracting this from HEDF gives us deficit measure #8,
PAHEDF, which is the Price Adjusted High Employment Deficit-Federal
Government, constructed using this “simple” method of price
adjustment. 14 In 1993, PAHEDF was $144.4 billion, or 2.3% of nominal
GDP. Using the same method (but using HEDT and net total government
debt instead of HEDF and net federal debt) produces deficit measure #9, the
Price Adjusted High Employment Deficit-Total Government (PAHEDT).
In 1993, PAHEDT was $125.4 billion, or 2.0% of nominal GDP.
The difficulty encountered in making the price adjustments above
raises the question of whether such work is actually necessary at all. After
construction (from Flow of Funds data, with U.S. government retirement fund reserves
excluded). As an approximation, Eisner suggests using the negative of “Government Net
Financial Assets-Federal” from Table B-112 of the 1994 Economic Report of the President,
which is measured at par value rather than market value.
14 In practice, the difference between the complex method and the simple
method of computing price effects was arguably small, only $6.1 billion (or 0.2% of GDP)
in 1993, and never exceeding $7.6 billion. The difference did, however, go as high as 57%
and as low as -62%, averaging 2% over the period 1963-93, leaving open the question of
whether there is empirical significance in the difference between the two. However,
correlations between the two raw series as well as between annual changes for the two
series (similar to those reported in Tables 3 and 4 below) were 0.999 and 0.994, respectively.
In none of the econometric tests performed for this analysis, moreover, was there more
than the slightest difference between results for the complex series and the simple series.
Therefore, only results for the simple series are reported. For the interested reader, full
results are available from the author.
page 15all, like any deficit, the best method for measuring PAHEDx is to express it
as a percentage of nominal GDP, to account for the increasing ability of the
economy to support government debt. (Why one should use nominal rather
than real GDP is, alas, more complicated than might be imagined, as
discussed below.)
Since the numerator of this deficit variable has been adjusted for
price effects, should it not be possible to adjust the denominator for inflation
by using real GDP, with the price adjustments simply canceling out?
Certainly, this would be true if the nominal-to-real adjustment is
accomplished simply by dividing the annual deficit by a price index. If that
were all that was going on, a large amount of unnecessary effort would
have been spent trying to account for inflation’s effects on the deficit.
However, what is happening here is conceptually different. The
price adjustment does not deflate the annual nominal deficit to real dollars.
Instead, this involves a numerically larger reduction of the nominal deficit,
in that we are subtracting from the (high-employment) deficit the effect of
inflation on the entire accumulated debt. Specifically, the price-adjusted
deficit equals the deficit minus the “inflation tax,” which is “levied” against
all outstanding debt, while the method suggested in the previous paragraph
would merely subtract the inflation tax on one particular year’s defici&a
stock/flow distinction of profound importance.
The resulting price-adjusted deficit is not yet, in fact, a “real”
quantity. The appropriate denominator for expressing this deficit as a real
value is (as noted above) nominal GDP, which allows the nominal deficit
minus price effects to be expressed as a percentage of the nominal income.
This allows the price level to cancel out of the ratio, giving a result which
(assuming away the other complications already noted) corresponds
page 16conceptually to a “change in the real indebtedness of the government.”
Whether this conceptual difference matters empirically is, of course,
another question; attempts to infer answers to that question are the subject
of the empirical estimates reported below.
E. Capital Accounting
Most states in the United States, most industrialized countries, and
virtually all large businesses around the world differ from the United States
federal government in one key respect-they use Capital Accounting to
separate consumption expenditures from investment expenditures. In the
private sector, in fact, capital accounting is an essential element of “good
accounting practices.” For any corporation, the difference between an
expenditure on a Christmas party and the purchase of new computer
hardware is easily noted by counting the first as an operating expense and
the second as a capital expense. Prudent fiscal management involves
balancing the operating budget, but deliberately not balancing the capital
budget. This carries over to the balanced-budget requirements imposed on
a large majority of the state budgets in the U.S., because the requirements
are imposed only on operating budgets. Since the U.S. federal government
does not even keep a capital account, however, a balanced-budget
requirement would have far different effects on the federal government
than it has on state governments [cf. Eisner, 19931.
Having the federal government institute the use of capital accounts
would, therefore, seem to be unarguably necessary. That it has not been
done is, no doubt, due in large measure to inertia and other factors beyond
the realm of economic analysis. However, one substantive economic
concern weighing against federal adoption of capital accounts is that they
might become an irresistible blank check for any spending program favored
page 17by an influential lawmaker. The operative logic could well become: Call it
investment, move it on to the capital account, borrow some money, and
forget it. Some in the popular press have even gone so far as to label capital
accounting a “magic trick” best avoided by fiscally responsible lawmakers
[Pennar, 19931.
Before drawing this worst-case conclusion, however, it is worth
considering the experiences of the thousands of organizations and
governments already using capital accounting. There is apparently no
systematic analysis to date concluding that capital accounting is generally
abused where it is in use.ls,ls Moreover, the existence of well-tested
accounting standards from national regulatory and advisory bodies (most
prominently, the Financial Accounting Standards Board) makes it at least
possible that the federal government could be given an accounting system
that would be relatively difficult to abuse. 17 Better that than to continue
15 An exception to this, ironically, is the case of state governments that must
meet constitutional balanced-budget requirements. It is apparently frequently true that
constitutional balanced-budget rules have caused state governments to engage in
“creative” accounting. See, for example, a discussion of this by the former Comptroller of
New York State [Regan, 19951.
16 It is also true that there is no systematic analysis to date showing the
absence of such abuse where capital accounts are used. While strict rules of argument
might label such an effort unnecessary on the grounds that it is “proving a negative” (the
burden of proof falling on the assertion that capital accounting might be abused), it would
nevertheless be comforting to rely on more than debating tactics to advocate capital
budgeting. Therefore, this will be the subject of further research.
17 The Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board is, in fact, constantly
page 18using what is indisputably an incorrect method of accounting.
This error is carried over into the standard treatment of government
spending in most professional treatments of fiscal issues. After separating
private spending into consumption and investment (C + I), government
spending is lumped into one variable (G). A more appropriate formulation
would have aggregate expenditures defined as follows: E = Cp + Ip + CG +
IG, where the subscripts P and G stand for private and government,
respectively.1s This would allow the consumption and investment accounts
to be consolidated, and would make clear that if a one dollar decrease in
private investment spending is replaced by a one dollar increase in
government investment spending, that would not only have no effect
overall spending but also no net effect on national investment.
on
In constructing the federal capital account adjustments for the
present purposes, four spending categories will be treated as public
investment: non-defense durable goods, education, natural resources, and
labor training and services. [Eisner, 1994a, uses a different set of
expenditures, notably including research and development spending,
which gives him nominal total gross federal capital expenditures in 1992 of
$530 billion, as opposed to $113.6 billion by my much more restrictive
methodology.]
evaluating various accounting rules that might be used by a federal capital accounting
system.
18 This is already done in the United Nations’ System of National Accounts.
The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis will also soon begin reporting data using this
method in the NIPA.
page 19It is certainly true that many of the dollars spent under these
categories are not actually investment spending (administrative expenses,
for example); but it is also true that many of the dollars spent under other
categories should be counted as investment spending (various aspects of
transportation or criminal justice spending, for example). However,
lacking true capital accounts with a more detailed breakdown within
spending categories, this admittedly imperfect measure will have to suffice.
In addition to these four spending categories, the net change in
government-owned capital goods, as provided by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis [1994] is the fifth and final category of government investment
spending. The total of these five categories provides an estimate of gross
capital expenditures, from which depreciation is subtracted to define net
capital expenditures. Depreciation is calculated, following Eisner’s [ 1994al
treatment of intangible capital depreciation, to be two-thirds of gross capital
expenditures. 1s Subtracting these spending categories from PAHEDF20
results in KPAHEDF, the Capitalized Price-Adjusted High Employment
Deficit for the Federal Government, deficit measure #lo. In 1993, this
showed a deficit of $36.6 billion, or 0.57% of nominal GDP. By a similar
19 The depreciation calculation is not necessary for the net change in
government-owned capital goods, nor is it necessary for the durable goods series, since
depreciation has already been netted out of the estimates.
20 Since the investment spending of the government is, at least conceptually,
not done in response to cyclical changes in the economy (or, at least, is not done
automatically in response thereto), it is appropriate to combine the (hypothetical) high-
employment deficit estimates directly with the (actual) capital account estimates without
fear of incompatibility.
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PAHEDT produces KPAHEDT (deficit measure #ll>, which showed a
surplus of $15.2 billion in 1993, or 0.25% of nominal GDP.
This analysis of the capital account is, however, arguably
incomplete. While the asset side of the capital account is considered in
some detail, the only entry on the liability side is depreciation of
government-owned capital. Every government, however, along with its
investment activities (which will yield benefits in the future), sometimes
engages in activities and makes decisions which must be paid for in the
future. Governments commit themselves to pension guarantees, loan
guarantees, and liabilities for future retirement benefits. When this is done
on an unfunded basis, those future liabilities arguably constitute a
necessary further adjustment to the deficit.
Indeed, it has been argued [for example, Kotlikoff 19921 that the
entire budget deficit concept is tautological, since the measured deficits
reflect only those activities which are defined as expenditures and taxation.
Naturally, therefore, new definitions would result in new deficit
measures-without changing any real activities of the government, or any
real responses by economic actors. For example, relevant to the present
issue, Auerbach 119941 points out that if the Social Security system were
replaced with “...an actuarially fair public pension system investing in
government debt plus an old age transfer program to the elderly. . . ,” this
change would immediately raise the national debt by the stock of
outstanding unfunded liabilities of the social security system-without
changing anything real.
Thus, the annual deficit could include annual changes in that part of
the debt that reflects changes in unfunded liabilities. By far the largest of
page 21these (in terms of either total assets or total liabilities) is the Social Security
Old Age Survivors and Disability Trust Fund (OASDI), the assets and
liabilities of which are estimated on an “open group” and “closed group”
basis. Since the closed group includes only those persons currently within
the Social Security System, while the open group includes all those
(including those not yet born) estimated to be in the system within the next
seventy-five years, the open group estimates provide a more appropriate
theoretical foundation from which to estimate the unfunded liabilities of the
system.
In 1993, the actuarial deficiency in the OASDI trust fund was $1,863.7
billion. Including these liabilities in the capitalized price-adjusted high-
employment deficit21 results in KLPAHEDx, the Capitalized (with
Liabilities) Price-Adjusted High Employment Deficits for both the federal
government and the total government sector. 22 In 1993, KLPAHEDF (deficit
measure #12) was -$54.5 billion, or -0.88% of nominal GDP, while
21 Extending the analysis to all unfunded liabilities is not possible, because
the basic concept of an unfunded liability is not well-defined in the aggregate. That is,
some transfer payments are financed through general revenues, which are not earmarked
in advance for a particular use. Thus, the. OASDI accounts provide a unique opportunity to
analyze the obligations entered into by governments in advance, since they are legally
identified and carefully tracked.
22 There is, unfortunately, as yet no systematic set of estimates of totals for the
states which would correspond to these estimates for the federal government. Therefore,
for the estimates that follow, the federal unfunded portion of OASDI is added to KPAHEDF
as well as WAHEDT to provide estimates of a more complete capital account for both
federal-only and total government measures of the fiscal deficit.
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GDP. (The negative signs, again, indicate a surplus.)
While the inclusion of unfunded liabilities resulted in surpluses in
1993, this is by no means the typical result. Indeed, the unfunded liabilities
of the social security trust fund have varied widely (even wildly) over the
twenty-plus years that they have been tracked. At their most extreme, they
went from an annual surplus of $4.4 trillion in 1978 (double the nominal
GDP) to a deficit of $3.3 trillion the following year, and back to a $2.8 trillion
surplus in 1980. Their sheer magnitude dwarfs the other elements of the
deficit accounts; and the magnitude of their changes completely dominates
everything else in regression analyses. Thus, while empirical results for
deficit measures #12 and #13 are reported below, they are probably
meaningless, and they are certainly not comparable to the other results.
Indeed, as noted in Section III below, the four deficit measures
which correct for the capital accounts are not theoretically designed to
measure the same things as are the other measures of the deficit.
Although the non-capitalized deficits differ from one another in other
respects, they have a common feature: each in its own way is designed to
measure the stimulus to aggregate demand caused by federal spending on
goods and services. The current/capital distinction is not important in that
regard. KPAHEDx and KLPAHEDx, on the other hand, tell how much of
the borrowing for such spending was done for current, operating
expenditures. The applicability of the various deficit measures to different
macroeconomic questions is, therefore, a key issue. This is addressed in
the next section.
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right measure of the deficit. The benefits and costs attributed to the deficit
are varied, and various measures of the deficit might be necessary to
consider them. The analysis following, indeed, indicates that this
possibility turns out to be true-that two measures of the deficit (PAHEDT
and either KPAHEDT or KLPAHEDT) are theoretically necessary to assess
fully the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy. Moreover, several of the
purported harms of deficits simply cannot happen-no matter which
measure of the deficit one uses. The potential benefits are considered
presently, with the potential harms detailed thereafter.
For the analysis which follows, it is useful to cast the discussion
within the familiar aggregate demand/aggregate supply model of the
macroeconomy, based on the neo-classical/Keynesian synthesis. While
many variations and alternatives to this model exist, this simple approach
(adjusted to use flow values of prices and output rather than stock values)
will provide a framework sufficient to analyze the relevant arguments.23
To summarize explicitly the basics of the model (which can be found
in most undergraduate textbooks, for example Dornbusch and Fischer
[19921):  real GDP growth is on the horizontal axis; inflation is on the
23 Given this approach, the present analysis will not consider so-called
“equivalence” effects (based on Barro 119741) of changes in government borrowing. Were
the equivalence concept to be taken seriously in its most extreme form, of course, it would
make the entire discussion irrelevant. It is possible, however, to argue that there are
equivalence-like tendencies that need to be considered. See Seater C19851, for example, for a
discussion of why these issues might be important.
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the level of real GDP growth achieved when unemployment is at NAIRU;
there is a downward-sloping aggregate demand curve that moves right
(left) due to expansionary (contractionary) fiscal and monetary policies; and
there is a short-run aggregate supply curve that is flat at extremely low
levels of output and becomes nearly vertical to the right of the long run
aggregate supply curve. In addition, expectations of inflation always adjust
over time to move the economy to long run equilibrium at the NAIRU rate of
GDP growth.
A. How Deficits Can be Good
In this context, the most obvious benefit of increases in deficit
spending is faster growth of real output. Higher deficits shift the aggregate
demand curve to the right, and the movement along the short-run
aggregate supply curve produces higher growth of real GDP (as well as
higher inflation). If the economy starts below NAIRU output growth, this
ends a recession without further inflation; but if it starts at or above NAIRU
growth, the long run result will be a higher inflation rate without
permanently higher GDP growth. Thus, the benefit of higher deficits is
always more output in the short run, with the benefit persisting into the
long run if the deficit is a counter-cyclical measure. This relationship
(between higher deficits and higher GDP growth) will be tested in the
empirical analysis to follow, in separate equations with other potential
causes of aggregate demand shifts (changes in the monetary base and
changes in real exchange rates, which would change net exports with a
lag) as additional explanatory variables.
Typically, a fall in the unemployment rate is associated with higher
GDP growth. Higher output growth is associated with higher labor
page 25demand, and thus unemployment falls as output growth rises. The
persistence of this, again, depends on whether the unemployment rate falls
below NAIRU. If so, the long run adjustment process will move the labor
market back to equilibrium at NAIRU, by assumption. This relationship
(between higher deficits and decreases in unemployment) will also be tested
in the empirical analysis to follow, again with real exchange rates as an
additional explanatory variable.
A third benefit of deficit spending (that is not immediately obvious in
the main graph of this model) is potential “crowding-in” of private
investment. [See B. Friedman, 1978.1 Usually assumed to be operative only
below full employment output growth, this idea states that private firms
will tend to respond to evidence of stronger demand for their products by
increasing their spending on capital goods. This, in turn, creates a further
boost to GDP. When the economy reaches-or nears-capacity, the effect
discontinues, as firms see that it is fruitless to buy new capital when there
are no workers available to hire to use that capital. While this effect will not
be estimated explicitly in the empirical work below, it is possible (given the
reduced-form nature of the equations tested) that the relationship between
GDP growth and budget deficits will partially reflect a crowding-in effect.
These three potential benefits are most likely to be associated with the
non-capitalized measures of the fiscal deficit. That is, they are generally
not dependent on the composition of the spending or taxing that goes into
the change in the deficit, but are simply responses to surges in aggregate
spending. Among the nine non-capitalized measures described above, the
one that should correspond most closely to the deficit envisioned in the
aggregate supply/aggregate demand model is PAHEDT, since it eliminates
price effects, includes the entire government sector, and is not affected by
page 26the level of real GDP growth.
the
A fourth benefit of deficit spending occurs only when the increase in
deficit is caused by higher public capital spending. This public
investment should cause the economy to grow faster in the long run and,
moreover, potentially support even higher levels of private investment. On
the latter point, Erenburg [1994] finds that higher levels of public
investment lead to higher levels of private investment, presumably because
public investment often takes the form of the infrastructure needed as a
platform for private growth. The best measure of this benefit would be, of
course, the difference between PAHEDT and either KPAHEDT or
KLPAHEDT (depending on one’s view of the appropriate capital accounting
procedure). That is, balance in KPAHEDT or KLPAHEDT coincident with a
PAHEDT deficit would indicate that some governmental
undertaken public investment.
B. How De&its Canbe Bad
units have
The down side of deficits is a matter of extensive public discussion.
Blinder [1991] boils the possible harms down to a list of six: national
bankruptcy, inflation, crowding out of investment, crowding out of net
exports, directly billing future generations for current consumption,24 and
political gridlock. The first is definitionally impossible (as long as debt is
24 This is the naive argument that it is possible to have current IOU’s paid by
future generations, as opposed to the two crowding out arguments, which argue that future
generations are made to indirectly “pay” for current generations’ profligacy by inheriting
a smaller economy (or capital stock) than they would have. The crowding out arguments
are potentially true, pending empirical verification or falsification; but the naive
argument is, as argued below and in Blinder 119911, logically false in a closed economy.
page 27denominated in nominal amounts of the home currency) and the last is not
actually an issue of the level of the deficit and is thus outside the ken of the
current study.z5 Each of the remaining four potential harms will be
considered presently.
IIlfhti0I.l
That inflation is an inevitable result of deficit spending is, to many
politicians (and apparently all bond traders), axiomatic. Either through a
Phillips Curve relationship, in which the deficit lowers unemployment and
concurrently raises inflation, or a Quantity Theory argument, the idea that
a higher deficit leads to higher prices simply must be true.
In the Phillips Curve case (the mechanics of which were alluded to
25 The oft-repeated argument here is that we must reduce the deficit (even if
there were nothing actually bad about deficits) because everyone thinks deficits are bad;
and therefore, if we do not, we will continue to argue about not reducing it rather than
dealing with our real problems. Legal scholars refer to this type of argument as the
“heckler’s veto,” in which a person is prevented from exercising their rights, usually free
speech rights, because of the threat that a potential listener might get angry at what is said
and hurt someone or create some other problem.
In the context of the deficit, what we are saying is that we should do something
which is at best pointless and at worst economically harmful, because a lot of people think
we should. It is amazing that we are willing to engage in such double-think, rather than
redirect our efforts to educating ourselves to the real costs and benefits of public borrowing.
If the arguments against deficits [see, for example, B. Friedman, 1988, 19911 are correct,
then they should stand on their own. Doing something wrong in order to do something
right, however-especially since no serious attempt has been made to see if we could
educate ourselves -is to submit to sophistry.
page 28in the discussion of the aggregate supply/aggregate demand model above),
what matters is the fiscal impulse (from all levels of government): so the
deficit measure appropriate to analyze the likelihood of inflation is again
PAHEDT.
If it is true, however, that correctly-measured deficits rose in the
1980’s, this theory has some heavy empirical lifting to do to explain away
the disinflation of that decade. Moreover, for the entire sample period, the
empirical results below indicate that higher deficits are-if anything-
associated with lower inflation, a strongly counter-intuitive result.
Perhaps one reason for this is that the Phillips Curve is not as simple
as it might seem-a monotonically negative relationship between inflation
and unemployment. The shape of the short-run aggregate supply curve
determines the shape of the Phillips Curve; so an essential question, in a
Phillips Curve defined around a NAIRU relationship, is whether there are
any ranges of the short-run aggregate supply curve that are flat. If so, then
there are situations where it is possible to raise deficit spending without
raising inflation at all, successfully lowering unemployment at no “cost”
(i.e., no increase in inflation).
Further, even if the short-run relationship is negatively sloped, it is
still possible that the current unemployment rate is above NAIRU. If that
is the case, then it is possible to choose to move to a lower unemployment
rate and pay for the move with a permanently higher (but non-accelerating)
rate of inflation. Only if deficit spending pushed the unemployment rate
below NAIRU would the rate of inflation accelerate; and that would be due
to the presumably inevitable re-adjustment to long-run equilibrium at
NAIRU. Therefore, simple correlations between deficits and inflation will
tell us little without conditioning the test for the level of unemployment,
page 29which is what the tests below are designed to do. That the results are still
not indicative of a positive deficit/inflation relationship is, therefore, even
more problematic for those who argue that inflation is inevitably associated
with deficit spending.
If, however, it is a quantity theory story of inflation that is being told,
the driving force is not the deficit at all but the change in the money supply.
The decrease in inflation during the debt run-up in the 1980’s does less
damage to this story than to the Phillips Curve story, because, as Blinder
[1991] notes, only about ten percent of the increase in debt in the eighties
was monetized. Since there is no apparent mechanical or theoretical
connection between deficits and their percentage of monetization, however,
this argument would seem to be entirely irrelevant to the deficit debate, and
thus would have no associated deficit measure. As McCallum [1990, p. 9661
notes, in a model with a Quantity Theory relationship: “. . .Unless tax and
spending patterns are such as to generate an unsustainable path...
different fiscal rules will imply different ongoing inflation rates... only if
they result in different money stock growth rates.”
The possibility of the fiscal authorities following such an
“unsustainable path,” however, deserves serious consideration. Since there
is some outer limit to the amount of lending available to even the U.S.
Federal government, the question is: How long can the fiscal authority run
deficits while the monetary authority avoids monetizing those deficits?
The seminal theoretical essay in this regard is Sargent and Wallace
[1981], who show that26 the problem can be analyzed as a game between the
26 For copious references to this strand of literature, and for a good (and
characteristically lucid) discussion of the issues involved, see McCallum L19901.
page 30monetary and fiscal authorities. The relevant case for the present analysis
is the game in which the fiscal authority is allowed to move first, setting its
path of future deficits, followed by the monetary authority, which must
accommodate the deficits (and, hence, create inflation) if the public is
unwilling to demand the bonds offered by the fiscal authority. This
unwillingness will, in fact, materialize whenever the demand for bonds
implies an interest rate on bonds greater than the growth rate of the
economy, since a path of unending deficits without monetary
accommodation would violate a transversality condition.
On the empirical side, a survey by Seater [1985] concludes that there
are very few empirical tests that demonstrate a connection between deficits
and monetization or inflation, while there are many studies which show no
such connection. In fact, Seater claims that the major study which does
find a connection between government debt and interest rates [Feldstein,
19811, has “... results which arise from data errors and improper handling
of simultaneity problems. Correction of these yields results supporting full
tax discounting [i.e., Ricardian Equivalence].“27
The real issue, therefore, is whether the United States is, or has
been, anywhere close to the point where the monetary authority would have
been forced to monetize any further government borrowing. If we were to
reach that point, then the Quantity Theory would become relevant to the
27 One should, indeed, take note that Seater’s survey is extremely sympathetic
to the so-called Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis (although he does offer a disclaimer at
one point to the effect that he is deliberately over-stating the case for the hypothesis). Those
who are less enamored of that hypothesis are likely to find his reading of the evidence as to
the neutrality of fiscal deficits less persuasive as well.
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Investment
The most theoretically and empirically promising argument against
deficits is, of course, crowding out of private investment. Taking the form
of the familiar re-writing of the leakages-equals-injections equilibrium
condition28,  total household savings (S) are divided between private
investment (I), total government borrowing (G-T), and net
borrowing/lending by foreigners to finance a domestic trade surplus/deficit
(Ex-Im).
Since this formulation lacks a processual explanation of cause and
effect, however, the crowding out argument is often made in an alternative
form: the crowding out of private investment is said to occur through
financial channels, with higher fiscal deficits leading to higher real
interest rates (assuming that the country’s capital markets are at least
partially closed to international capital flows-i.e., our new bonds are not
all sold to foreign investors-which would otherwise prevent the domestic
interest rate from deviating from the world rate), which cause (presumably
interest-sensitive) investment expenditures to fall. (This latter explanation
is embedded in the slopes of the aggregate demand and short run aggregate
supply curves, in that they lower the potency of any multipliers due to
28 It is well understood that the measured quantities of leakages and
injections are not the same as the equilibrium quantities of leakages and injections.
However, the accounting identities are generally taken to be acceptable proxies for the
values at equilibrium, and that simplification will be carried forward here. However, it
should be understood that unintentional inventory adjustments and related issues are
theoretically important; their empirical importance is a matter for potential further study.
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All of which is familiar; however, the very familiarity of these
arguments belies a bewildering array of questions about the deficit
measures appropriate to them. The first issue is the inclusiveness of the
NIPA’s definition of investment, i.e., the official investment figures include
residential construction and inventory adjustments along with plant and
equipment expenditures. However, if the crowding out argument is applied
to either of the two former variables (and there is, of course, plentiful
evidence that housing responds very strongly to changes in interest rates;
and inventory theory is a separate study in itself), the argument is much
less compelling.
It is one thing to suggest that productive business investments in
plant and equipment are being prevented by government profligacy; this is
clearly a case of pointless consumption replacing useful investment. On
the other hand, if the argument is that government borrowing is crowding
out some inventories, the moral certitude that this is always bad is
somewhat lacking. Moreover, even if the other argument is made that
housing is not being built because of government borrowing, this is not
quite as obviously bad as it might seem, given that the housing thus
crowded out is heavily subsidized by the tax code, and given that it includes
luxury homes which are not primary residences. This is not to say that
replacing inventories and housing with government purchases is never
bad; but it is suggesting that the crux of the crowding out issue should be
business plant and equipment spending, since it seems a priori clear (even
for those who are not aficionados of growth theory) that that type of
page 33investment ought not to be artificially reduced.29
The appropriate measure of the deficit to capture the amount of
crowding out is, again, PAHEDT. Every dollar of spending by a
government (by assumption, always bad) is a dollar that is not available for
private investment (by assumption, always good39 If the economy is below
full employment, increases in OBD, UDF, or UDT could simply be caused by
the weak economy, while HEDx is affected by swings in inflation; and since
the crowding-in argument above notes that government purchases can
raise investment , every dollar of deficit spending below full employment
would be enhancing rather than detracting from investment.
A more sophisticated treatment of government spending (as noted
above), in which both private and government spending are separated into
consumption and investment, will require a government capital account to
29 Whether it ought to be artificially induced is another question. Eisner and
Pieper  [19921 suggest that it is at least not obvious that more investment is always better than
less, since there must be some level of consumption below which we might not want to fall;
and serious analysis of the marginal equality between
versus more consumption is conspicuously lacking in
proposals.
the benefits of more investment
most pro-investment policy
30 This is another area where the standard assumptions could benefit from
more careful analysis. Given the prominent examples of private investment spending
that is not productive (particularly unused commercial real estate properties), it is evident
that thoughtful analysis of the social value of spending needs to be applied to private as well
as public spending. The role of tax incentives in these episodes of private waste has
received much
real financing
scrutiny; but the question of whether a given project’s real returns match its
rate of interest has been less explored.
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would at least introduce the possibility that all government spending is not
thrown into a black hole, never to provide a positive social return. What is
being crowded out-by what-would be more important than the mere
of crowding out itself. More will be said about this subject below.
Empirical tests (using U.S. data) of the claim that higher deficit
spending leads to lower growth (presumably due to the reduction in
fact
national savings and, thus, crowding out of productive private investment)
have been, at best, contradictory [Eisner, 1994c, concludes that price-
adjusted, high-employment deficits increase national saving, while B.
Friedman, 1988 and 1991, argues the opposite].
For international comparisons, the most recent is Fischer [1993],
who finds that, for a sample of ninety-four countries from 1962 through
1988, while a majority of countries that had high deficits also had low
growth, there were some countries (for example, Italy and Morocco in
different time periods) that continuously ran deficits of ten percent or more
and still grew at rates similar to non-deficit countriessl. For these and
other countries, however, the high deficits coexisted with high savings
rates and financial repression. This indicates that, while high fiscal
deficits are not sufficient to decimate a country’s growth, the relevance of
their experience to the U.S. situation is suspect.
coLlsumptioIl
Higher real interest rates, which might be the result of higher
31 Significantly, and relevant to the previous discussion regarding whether
budget deficits cause inflation, Fischer treats inflation and budget deficits as separate,
independent variables that might affect a country’s growth rate.
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effects32  or durable goods effects. Even if this effect turned out to be true,
however, this is not in the same category of arguments against deficit
spending as crowding out of private investment. The fundamental and
legitimate concern about reducing private investment is that we are
reducing the growth of productive capacity in the economy, and therefore
the size of the economy that we are passing on to future generations. This
logic might also be extended, with qualifications, to consumer durables.
However, the crowding out of current private non-durables consumption
creates no such burden.33 Rather, it is merely-at worst, if the government
spending is purely for consumption-the substitution of one type of
32 While the major models (esp. MPS) show strong wealth effects on
consumption, it is worth pondering whether such an effect is conceptually reasonable. For,
if greater portfolio wealth is really affecting the consumption patterns of households, it
must be doing so through the households that have both significant portfolios and are
currently consumption-constrained. This upper-middle-class group (who account for
about 10% of total consumption spending), therefore, would have to be altering their
consumption patterns enough to explain 100% of the variation due to interest rate effects.
While a statistical wealth effect is quite visible, therefore, it is still a puzzle as to whether
this result is actually due to the reasons usually proposed.
33 It could still be argued that the crowding-in effect (of private investment
responding to increases in aggregate demand) is somehow more potent when responding to
demand surges led by private spending than when it is caused by government spending. If
so, even less than a one-for-one crowding out of consumption by deficits could lead to more
than one-for-one indirect crowding out of investment. However, there is no a priori
reasoning which makes this argument persuasive in the absence of empirical suggestion.
page 36consumption for another, with no future macroeconomic impact.
For this argument to fit into the leakages-equals-injections
framework, moreover, ceteris paribus reasoning requires that we assume
that both private investment and net exports are constant. This, however,
would mean that the increase in deficit spending (which, in the United
States in the 1980’s, was largely caused by tax cuts rather than spending
increases) is matched by an increase in savings, a result not observed by
any stretch of the imagination (in the standard measures of saving@)
during the run-up in nominal debt since 1980. Private savings as a
percentage of GDP has generally fallen in that time, although not
monotonically-which is, in fact, the basis of much of the economics
profession’s concern about the macroeconomic context in which deficits
have risen.35
It is still possible to argue from, for example, a libertarian
perspective that such consumption substitution is still a genuinely bad
thing because it prevents private decision-makers from maximizing their
consumption bundles at the equilibrium interest rate. However, much of
the concern about government spending and deficits, especially at the
federal level, is based on the assertion that the political system is biased
toward deficits precisely because voters are unwilling to give up the
34 Eisner’s [1994cl method of calculating national savings finds otherwise,
however, as noted above.
35 Obviously, in the 1980’s ceteris were not paribus. However, this large a
divergence of reality from theory (savings rates falling substantially rather than rising,
in response to tax cuts and rising real interest rates) is at least suggestive that the model
would need a lot of recalibration to be saved.
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question of consumption-for-consumption crowding out, the argument is at
least open. In any case, it would no longer be a macroeconomic debate.
Net Exports
The remaining item in the leakages-equals-injections crowding out
story is net exports. When deficit spending rises, if savings remains
constant or falls, and if private investment is not crowded out, the only
remaining place from which to draw funds is abroad-either by lending out
less (net) or borrowing more. This is of special interest because it is at least
arguably what actually happened (rather than crowding out of private
investment) as a result of the U.S. experience in the nineteen eighties
[Blinder, 19911.
Once again, the sequence of events can be told through financial
channels. If the higher deficit spending leads to higher relative real
interest rates, this will raise the value of the dollar as investors shift into
dollar-denominated financial assets (most obviously, the Treasury
securities that are being issued to finance the debt). The higher dollar
value then leads to falling net exports. The unprecedented drop in U.S. net
exports in the eighties, as well as the record highs reached by the dollar in
the middle of the decade, seem to support this scenario; but the rise in the
trade deficit was largely due to the coincidence of rising imports and
stagnant exports. Since the rise in imports is explainable by simply
pointing out that rising incomes lead to rising purchases of everything
(including imports), this is not necessarily a crowding out effect that we
have observed. It could simply be a failure of foreign demand for our goods
to keep up with our demand for foreign goods. Moreover, the volatility in
the value of the dollar, without co-movements in net exports, makes these
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so-called J-curve effects)-to defend.
For the purposes of public policy, however, the issue goes beyond
whether crowding out occurs. Exactly the same questions raised under
crowding out of private investment arise here. Since the interest paid to
foreigners represents lost resources to society, just as the interest paid on
domestically-held bonds represents lost real growth due to private domestic
investment, the purpose of the borrowing becomes the key issue. If the
borrowing is used to finance consumption, this is a net loss. However, if
the borrowing is used to finance investment (for example, the foreign
borrowing by the U.S. in the late nineteenth century that financed
industrial expansion), then relative rates of return become the key issue,
and KPAHEDT or KLPAHEDT becomes the important deficit variable. The
crowding out of net exports argument becomes, therefore, analytically
indistinguishable from crowding out of private investment.
BillingOurGrandchildren
The inter-generational shift question is one of the most commonly-
repeated among all deficit arguments. Unlike the logically plausible
crowding out arguments, which state that future generations will be worse
off than they otherwise would be because of inappropriate current levels of
consumption, this argument states that future generations are being
directly billed for current consumption. Supposedly, “we” have been having
a party, borrowing money, and passing on the bills-the increased
outstanding federal debt, both principal and interest-to be paid by future
generations. Even making the untenable assumption that the debt will ever
be actually paid off, this argument is completely incorrect for a closed
economy. The deficit is used to shift resources from one use today to a
page 39different use today, while the repayment involves shifting resources from
then-living taxpayers to then-living bond-holders. There is no Q& financial
liability passed on from one generation to the next.
Of course, this can have enormously important intra-social effects on
the distribution of wealth, and (as noted above) the shift of resources today
from one use to another can certainly have deleterious effects on the size of
the economy to be inherited by later generations (if the shift is from some
type of investment to some type of consumption-or even to some type of
investment with a lower rate of return than the investment from which
spending was shifted) but it is not a matter of having a, future generation of
Americans pay the bills of the present generation. We are borrowing from
ourselves, and they will be paying themselves, and thus this is not a burden
on the economy as a whole.
Given that the debt is one-eighth held by foreign entities, however, the
picture is slightly different. The annual “deficit” relevant in this case is the
change in the holding by foreigners of the domestic governments’ debt.36
Even here, however, the question is whether the increase in foreign-held
36 This will still miss indirect effects of government deficits. If such deficit
spending leads to greater foreign purchases of private domestic assets, then future
generations are losing more than the claims represented by foreign-held government debt.
This is the basis of much of the concern with the change in the status of the U.S. to “net
debtor” at the beginning of the 1980’s_although many have argued [for example, Eisner,
1994bl that this entire issue has been misanalyzed and mismeasured. While this issue is
important, therefore, including this effect in any official deficit measure is conceptually
difficult to conceive and, in practice, daunting to undertake. It is certainly beyond the
scope of the current inquiry.
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argument then reverts to that noted under crowding out of net exports
(which, in turn, reverted to the argument under crowding out of private
investment).
The arguments both for and against deficits seem to range across a
broad spectrum of macroeconomic issues. In fact, however, they all come
down to one basic question: is the spending by domestic governments
preventing something better from being purchased by private agents?
economy is not at full employment, this question is almost certainly
answered in the negative. If the spending is financed by central bank
If the
purchases of government debt, a separate set of monetary theory issues are
raised. In the end, however, the most sustainable arguments against
deficit spending are crowding out arguments, which must be supported on
the theoretical level by cyclical adjustment and careful capital accounting of
measured deficits.
Therefore, while it seemed originally that there might be several
“right” ways to measure the deficit, in fact only one-PAHEDT-is
suRicient in determining the size of an aggregate demand surge, and thus
in determining whether the benefits and the costs of deficit spending
accrue. Once the benefits and costs have been measured, it is then
necessary to use KPAHEDT or KLPAHEDT to determine whether any JJ&
harms have occurred. Whether these measures provide useful and
compelling empirical results is the subject of section IV.
c. Public Investment and the DebMo-GDP Ratio
The implication from the forgoing is that simply knowing that the
operating budget (KPAHEDT or KLPAHEDT) is in balance is enough to
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project has a positive rate of return (and thus is entered on the capital
account) does not say that it is worth pursuing over another (private)
project, which also has a positive rate of return. In a very perfect world,
there would be an account which not only separated government
investment from government consumption, but which identified the rate of
return of government investment spending. If there were then an
equivalent identification of the rate of return of private investment
expenditures, one could compare the two to decide which is more socially
beneficial. Even in this information-heavy world, however, the picture is a
bit too simple-assuming as it does that there is a single rate of return for
government investments and another for private investments. Since
different spending projects, within the universes of available private and
public investments, have varying rates of return, what matters is the rates
of return of the marginal private and public projects which might or might
not be undertaken.
While this familiar distinction might seem to require data far beyond
the information available to policy-makers, the financial crowding out story
provides a method of gathering a major part of the necessary information.
The neo-classical model of interest rates says that the equilibrium interest
rate reflects the value of the marginal investment project, since a rational
investor would borrow money at any interest rate at or below the rate of
return of a potential investment project.s7  Therefore, if government
37 This line of argument would also, of course, say that the equilibrium
quantity of investment projects is effkient. Whether this is an accurate depiction of the
way that interest rates are determined is, of course, controversial. It might well be that the
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investment, the projects that were crowded out would be not only the lowest-
valued but would have rates of return that are known to be below the new
equilibrium interest rate. Significantly, then, market interest rates (with
appropriate tax adjustments) would provide the rate of return for the
marginal private investment project.
This analysis, however, is only true if we assume away risk (and, in
particular, risk aversion). Many firms seem to calculate what are known
as “hurdle rates of return” for their investment decisions, which have been
estimated by surveys to be significantly higher than the market interest rate
[Poterba and Summers, 19921. This implies that firms are very unwilling to
invest in projects that have even a modest likelihood of failing to cover costs
(and/or that different firms are responsive to different segments of the term
structure). Therefore, for real-world comparisons, several important
adjustments would have to be made to determine, from the observable
market interest rates, the rate of return of the marginally crowded out
private investment projects.
The second piece of necessary information, the rate of return of the
governments’ marginal investment project, might be available ex post facto
from an indirect source. It can be argued that, under certain conditions
Federal Reserve’s policies have far more influence on interest rates than do changes in
investment demand or in the supply of savings. However, this critical line of reasoning
leads even further away from the notion that crowding out is necessarily bad, in that it
explicitly abandons the notion that the otherwise-efficient decisions of private agents are
being frustrated by government spending policies.
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country’s governments have been investing in projects that have a greater
rate of return than the interest rate at which they borrowed money.
To understand this, imagine that we were in the position where the
government sector’s fiscal operating account were in perpetual balance, so
that borrowing served only to finance public capital expenditures. In that
case, a rise in GDP at a rate faster than the debt is accumulating interest
should indicate that the country’s governments are doing something
“right.” Extending this logic, Eatwell [1994, p.1231 says: “So long as the
social rate of return on public investment is higher than the net cost . . . of
any borrowing used to finance it, then the ratio of debt to national income
will not rise.”
As intuitively obvious as this might be, it turns out not to be true. A
falling debt-to-GDP ratio (in the context of a balanced operating budget) is a
sufficient but not necessary condition to demonstrate that the governments’
spending projects are producing an acceptable rate of return. Specifically,
while it is true that a falling debt-to-GDP ratio would be good news in this
regard, it is not true that a rising debt-to-GDP ratio is always bad news.
The public sector can invest in projects with very good rates of return, yet
the debt-to-GDP ratio might still rise.
As a suggestive example, consider a scenario with very generous
assumptions about the rate of return on public investment. Specifically,
assume that, starting in year 1, the government sector finances $100 billion
38 This is closely related to the concept of “viability,” which says that the rate of
growth of the basic budget (which excludes interest payments) is permanently greater than
or equal to the rate of interest on government debt.
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percent interest while receiving a return of ten percent on the investment
(that is, an initial single “deposit” of $100 billion will immediately return $10
billion per year in higher GDP). Assume further that the initial level of
GDP is $5 trillion, while the initial level of government debt is $2.5 trillion,
so that the debt-to-GDP ratio is 50%. Both debt and GDP had been growing
at a steady-state rate of 4%.
To report the bottom line first, the interesting result in such a
situation is that the initial spike in the debt-to-GDP ratio does not fall
immediately and, in fact, rises for several years before beginning to fall (the
length of time depending on the assumptions one makes about GDP growth
and other factors.) This anomaly is due to the increase in the interest rate
(which is assumed to happen immediately) on all outstanding infra-
marginal debt: after the first year, the $2.6 trillion debt has grown by $130
billion, to $2.73 trillion; but the initial GDP has grown by its steady-state
rate of only 4% to $5.2 trillion, plus the $lOO,billion  investment has returned
ten percent to become $110 billion, for total GDP of $5.31 trillion. This
makes debt/GDP, which had spiked to 50.98% after the spending was
initiated, rise to 51.41% after one year. Debt/GDP continues to rise until the
percentage of the economy growing at 10% annually is large enough to
make the GDP grow faster than the debt.
A hidden assumption here is that the government spending
multiplier is equal to one, since the $100 billion spending shows up as a $100
billion surge in GDP. If the government spending multiplier is greater
than one (assuming that the entire multiplier shows up in GDP in the first
year after the spending takes place>, the debt/GDP ratio might start
trending down immediately or almost immediately. If the government
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debt-to-GDP ratio turns down.
As a related matter, as the reference above to Eatwell indicates, the
relevant cost of borrowing is the net cost of borrowing, i.e., the cost of
borrowing after taking into account the taxes generated and the reduction
in public unemployment payments. Hence, it is not accurate simply to
assume that the government spending shows up dollar-for-dollar as
greater debt and higher GDP. Even if the government spending multiplier
is equal to one, the investment project generates employment, lowering
transfer payments and raising tax revenues, unambiguously raising net
taxes39 and lowering the actual amount of borrowing. Whatever the
interest rate at which the marginal borrowing occurs, this lowers the
initial amount of borrowing and, hence, raises the annual rate of return of
the project. If a $100 billion spending project returns $10 billion per year, as
above, but only requires $80 billion dollars in net government financing, the
net social rate of return is 12.5%. Higher and lower government spending
multipliers affect this result in predictable ways.
Another very important assumption guiding these results is that the
government spending project begins to pay its ten percent dividend
immediately. In that way, it is like a consol  bond with a price of $100 billion
and a coupon payment of $10 billion. This is the best imaginable result of a
real investment; but by far the more realistic situation is that the project
takes several years before yielding any positive return. In the case of some
proposed projects that would plausibly constitute “investment” by the public
sector, the lag between the payment and the positive yields can be quite long
39 This is true even when dealing with a cyclically-adjusted deficit.
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programs really does prevent brain damage and developmental difficulties,
thus lowering later public spending on disabled adults while increasing
social productivity (and thus GDP), it will be fifteen to twenty years before
that return starts to show up in the economy. Therefore, the return to this
investment could not even begin to lower the debt-to-GDP ratio for even
longer than the previous analysis implies.
D. Estimating the Return to Public Investment
These theoretical and empirical issues argue that it is possible to
have a rising debt-to-GDP ratio even if governments have done nothing
“wrong”-whereas, continuing to assume that the only borrowing is on the
capital account, one cannot have a falling debt-to-GDP ratio without the
government having done something right in terms of public investment.
Therefore, direct estimation of the social rate of return of public
investments cannot, it seems, be side-stepped. 40
Empirical studies of the rates of return to public investments provide
wide-ranging and often contradictory results. Eisner [1994a] (citing
Aschauer [1989], Munnell [1990], and Eisner [1991b]) offers results which
are impressively indicative of high returns to public investment.
Cautioning that the numbers are better taken as suggestive than precise,
he notes that his results (which are based on cross-sectional data, not time
40 Erenburg’s [19941 work, noted previously, suggesting that public investment
encourages private investment in a direct sense-completely independent of a  crowding-
in effect, and quite possibly active even at full employment-suggests that this private-
versus-public rate of return calculation need only be undertaken if the net change in
private investment is negative (which is not certain, if her analysis is correct).
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times that of private investment. Eisner and Pieper [1992] cite the general
work of both Mansfield and Becker, indicating that the productivities of
various types of public investment equal or surpass the productivities of
gross private domestic investment. Similarly, Pinnoi [19941 analyzes public
infrastructure spending by region and offers a positive assessment of the
returns to basic infrastructure spending, but he notes (perhaps not
surprisingly) that the effects are highly variable across regions and
industries, depending on the types of infrastructure in which governments
are investing.
Less sanguine assessments were offered by three other recent
studies. Evans and Karras Cl9941 report no positive productivity at all (and
perhaps even negative returns) from public investment, analyzed by
comparing state-level data; Holtz-Eakin [1994] reports that education
spending seems to have a competitive return, but that no other types of
federal spending appear to have positive returns; and Nadiri and
Mamuneas [1994] offer disappointing estimates of the social rate of return
to two types of public investment: infrastructure and research and
development. Using three different methods of estimation, they offer a
range of estimated rates of return from 4.92% to 7.18% for infrastructure
and 5.79% to 8.72% for R&D. Only the high estimate for R&D, however,
exceeds their estimate of the social rate of return for private capital
spending, which is 8.65% after-tax. (If this analysis is true, however, it
immediately poses the question of why private capital has not been
purchased in much greater amounts than it has been, given that real-
world after-tax borrowing costs are often roughly half of Nadiri and
Mamuneas’s estimated rate of return. The most likely answer to this
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and the hurdle rates of return mentioned above.)
Two fundamental difficulties exist in all of these studies. First, there
is the difficulty of separating marginal rates of return from average rates of
return. While each study attempts to deal with this potential problem, it is
a matter of contention how successful any have been in solving it. But even
if they were perfectly reflecting the marginal return to various public
investments, they all suffer from the second problem; namely, they are all
retrospective rather than prospective. In other words, whatever one
concludes from the contentious studies noted above, that would still not
close the book on whether current policy should include public investment.
What is really needed is an assessment of the rate of return of any proposed
project before the project is initiated, since past failure is no guarantee of
future failure-and past success does not guarantee that future public
investments would pay off.
While this might seem to be asking too much of any decision-maker,
in fact it is exactly the same problem that we assume is being solved by
private decision-makers all the time. If-as standard theory asserts-
firms assess their entire array of potential projects and initiate them until
the net borrowing rate exceeds the projected return, then any other
economic agent should be able to apply the same methods to assess the
potential return to any other project. This is not intended to be an evasion of
the issue; assessing potential rates of return is difficult and perilous for any
analyst. The point here is simply that one decision-maker should not be
held to a higher standard than another. If everyone is merely guessing,
then work needs to be done to improve the methods of assessing potential
returns for all projects; but that is not a reason to rule out potential projects
page 49simply because they fall under the title “public spending.”
. Fcmometnc Res&
I analyze the basic statistics for each of the thirteen deficit measures.
Following that, I present analyses of correlations among the deficit
measures and among the changes in the deficit measures. I also analyze
econometric results for four equations: an inflation equation, an
unemployment equation, and two GDP growth equations. Each of the four
equations has a deficit variable on the right-hand side and is estimated
separately for each of the thirteen measures of the deficit derived earlier.
Three of the equations are designed to mimic analyses reported in Eisner
[1991a], while the fourth (the second growth equation) is based on work
reported in Eisner and Pieper [1992].
Finally, I estimate thirteen vector autoregressions (VAR) and
thirteen corresponding impulse response functions (IRF) for five variables
(a fiscal deficit measure, change in monetary base, GDP growth, inflation,
and short-term interest rates), based on Eisner and Pieper [1992].
Because both Eisner [1991a] and Eisner and Pieper[1992] separate the
post-1967 period from the pre-1967 period, only data beginning in 1967 is
analyzed here (except for the VAR’s, which are run from 1963-1993, where
possible). The four versions of the deficit that include structural deficit
estimates for the state and local sector (HEDT, PAHEDT, KPAHEDT and
KLPAHEDT) are limited in all equations to the period 1973-1993, since the
estimates from Kusko and Rubin [1993] begin in 1973. Also, the estimates
for the Social Security system’s unfunded liabilities begin in 1971,
restricting KLPAHEDF to the 1971-1993 period.
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Table 2 lists the basic summary statistics for each of the thirteen
deficit measures, as well as the same statistics for each measure when
divided by nominal GDP. The most remarkable aspect of these statistics is
the extreme range of the KLPAHEDx measures. While the maximum
deficit measured in any single year for the other eleven measures was
$340.50 billion, both KLPAHEDF and KLPAHEDT had maximum values
well in excess of four trillion dollars, fourteen times higher than the next
highest measure. Similarly, the largest surplus measured in any given
year for the first eleven measures was $172.29 billion, while both
KLPAHEDx measures had years with surpluses of significantly more than
three trillion dollars. Thus, even though the mean values of these two
measures show only slightly larger surpluses on average than do the
KPAHEDx measures, their standard deviations are over forty times larger
than the standard deviations for those measures.
Among the first eleven measures, the lowest deficits are the
KPAHEDx deficits, which actually were surpluses on average for the
sample period. (This, of course, is true basically by construction, since only
subtractions were made from PAHEDx to derive KPAHEDx.) The highest
average measure of deficits was OBD, while PAHEDT was the lowest
among non-capitalized measures. Generally, total-government deficit
measures were lower than federal-only deficit measures, and a uniform
decline can be also be seen as one increases the sophistication of the
measures.41
41 The DDGDPx measures do not fit easily into a listing of more or less
“sophisticated,” since they do not include cyclical or price adjustments but do measure
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Measure AiLL& Mb MeanSt.Dev.w MiQ iik.aQstser,
OBD 340.50 0.50 123.07 109.64 6.27% 0.05% 3.39% 1.75%
UDF 290.40 (3.20) 110.44 93.91 6.26% -0.35% 3.09% 1.68%
UDT 264.58 (13.40) 70.24 77.10 4.46% -0.65% 1.80% 1.51%
DDGDPF nm nm nm nm 3.75% -2.76% 0.77% 1.95%
DDGDPT nm nm
84::
nm 3.97% -3.32% 0.64% 2.17%
HEDF 215.00 7.00 69.85 4.53% 0.71% 2.50% 1.05%
HEDT 202.07 3.09 71.46 64.32 3.22% 0.20% 1.68% 1.02%
PAHEDF 144.36 (26.80) 36.96 52.32 3.35% -1.02% 0.87% 1.26%
PAHEDT 125.35 (72.75) 8.14 52.81 2.00% -2.45% -0.26% 1.43%
KPAHEDF 36.03 (110.46) (44.68) 37.35 0.73% -6.50% -2.60% 2.17%
KPAHEDT (15.74) (172.29) (102.95) 37.94 -0.25% -7.23% -3.75% 2.11%
KLPAHEDF 4,374.67 (3,378.52)  (124.57) 1,508.02  202.87% -138.92% -8.35% 68.69%
KLPAHEDT 4,321.64 (3,426.30)  (198.36) 1,576.44  200.41% -140.89% -11.23% 71.90%
i’igures are expressed in billions of dollars, except for percentages.
im = not meaningful; measures are already defined as percentages of GDP
sample period: 1967-1993, fiscal years; DDGDPF and DDGDP’I’ are calendar years;
KLPAHEDF is 1971-1993, fiscal years; HEDT, PAHEDT, KPAHEDT and KLPAHEDT
are 1973-1993, fiscal years.
sources: Economic Report of the President, 1994; Survey of Current Business, August 1994,
Economic Indicators, September 1994, CitiBase, 1978; Social Security data provided by
William Ritchie (Social Security Administration)
All of the deficit measures are spread similarly within their ranges.
Looking at the standard deviations relative to the difference between the
maximum and minimum values, for example, shows that double the
standard deviations (within which two-thirds of all observations fall) covers
between half and two-thirds of the total range. In other words, none of the
series was noticeably more clustered than any other.
Table 3 shows the statistical correlations between each of the thirteen
deficit measures, while Table 4 shows the correlations between annual
changes in the levels of the variables. (Note: All remaining tables appear at
changes in debt more accurately than OBD or UDx. Hence, when referring to more and
less sophisticated measures, I will deliberately ignore DDGDPx.
page 52the end of the text.) The lowest correlations are between DDGDPx and the
other measures, especially in Table 4. Many of the regression results
reflect these differences very clearly,
The effect of including state and local accounts can be seen by
comparing UDF with UDT, HEDF with HEDT, PAHEDF with PAHEDT,
DDGDPF with DDGDPT, KPAHEDF with KPAHEDT, and KLPAHEDF with
KLPAHEDT. The correlations between these pairs of variables shows very
similar results: while UDF and UDT weigh in at 0.918 and 0.907 (the
correlations on Table 3 and Table 4, respectively), DDGDPF and DDGDPT
have correlations of 0.975 and 0.976, HEDF and HEDT of 0.877 and 0.938,
PAHEDF and PAHEDT of 0.946 and 0.970, KPAHEDF and KPAHEDT of
0.932 and 0.970, and KLPAHEDF and KLPAHEDT of 1.000 and 1.000.
Finally, following the federal-only measures through their
theoretical improvements shows correlations between OBD and UDF of
0.963 and 0.992, between UDF and HEDF of 0.822 and 0.780, between HEDF
and PAHEDF of 0.938 and 0.872, between PAHEDF and KPAHEDF of 0.983
and 0.987, and between KPAHEDF and KLPAHEDF of 0.086 and 0.192.
Ignoring the last adjustment, the adjustments for structural deficits create
the largest divergences. A similar progression for total-government
measures shows the following: UDT to HEDT, 0.732 and 0.576; HEDT to
PAHEDT, 0.938 and 0.824; PAHEDT to KPAHEDT, 0.967 and 0.984; and
KPAHEDT to KLPAHEDT, -0.020, and 0.139. The adjustment for structural
deficits again introduces by far the largest divergence in the variables.
Notably, in neither case does the introduction of the first capital account
seem to make much difference, while the KLPAHEDx measures are almost
entirely uncorrelated to the other series.
These extreme results make KLPAHEDF and KLPAHEDT
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regressions reported below, even the signs of the estimated coefficients on
the last two deficit variables differ from the signs for all (or almost all) of the
other eleven measures. Their estimates are reported in the tables, but no
useful comparisons can be made. Therefore, I will not continue to
comment on these measures.
a correlations to other RlacroeconomicVariables
My analysis of the regression results will emphasize three questions:
first, is the explanatory power of a regression improved by increasing the
sophistication of the deficit measure-looking especially at PAHEDx, which
is the measure that would theoretically be most appropriate for these
equations? Second, is the explanatory power of the regression improved by
replacing any particular federal-only deficit measure with a total-
government measure (denoted by the letter T)? Third, do the signs of the
estimated coefficients of the deficit variables match those that would be
expected by the theory described earlier? In the subsequent section, my
analysis of the VAR’s and IRF’s will proceed along similar lines.
Each equation’s results are reported in Tables 5 through 8. Each
equation was estimated with contemporaneous values of the deficit
variables in simple ordinary least-squares regressions and in AR(l)
regressions (the top two panels in each table), with lagged values of the
deficit variables in simple OLS regressions and in AR(l) regressions (the
middle panels in each table)42, in instrumental variables (I.V.) equations
42 The reported AR(l) results are provided simply to provide comparability
with many of the results from Eisner. The Durbin-Watson statistics for all of the OLS
regressions (of all four basic equations) are comfortably in the range that indicates that
page 54with an extensive set of instruments, and in I.V. equations with a limited
set of instruments (the bottom panels in each table).
I report the estimated t-statistics for the independent deficit variable
in each equation, making a simple set of comparisons of the explanatory
power of federal-only uersus total-government deficit measures (reading
across in each panel) as well as comparisons of crude uersus sophisticated
deficit measures (reading down in each panel).
Every effort has been made to follow the methodology of Eisner 11991al
and Eisner and Pieper [1992], allowing for the expanded sample and for
several computational differences used in this analysis. The specifications
of the equations were chosen based on the conclusions in the papers noted;
that is, while Eisner reports results which test different specifications of an
equation, the equations here replicate his “preferred” specifications.
The first panel in each table represents the simplest method of
estimating each equation: ordinary least squares, with contemporaneous
serial correlation is not a problem, and the Q-statistics indicate that higher-order serial
correlation was not present, either. In the AR(l) regressions (both the regressions
summarized in Tables 5 through 8 and those run but not reported for the instrumental
variables regressions), moreover, estimates of rho were significant in only a tiny
minority of cases.
Therefore, if the point of this exercise were simply to report the “preferred results”
from my empirical analyses, only OLS results would be needed. Since Eisner’s
diagnostics argued otherwise, however, it is useful to report the AR(l) results for my
comparable regressions-if for no other reason than to show that those results argue for the
same conclusions.
page 55values of the deficit. It should be noted, however, that there are good
reasons to believe a priori that these specifications might be inappropriate.
First, as time series regressions, they are subject to potential serial
correlation. While the relevant diagnostics do not, as noted previously,
indicate that this is a problem, the results of the same regressions using
AR(l) correction are shown in the upper-right panel of each table.
Second, there is a strong possibility of reverse causality between the
left-hand and right-hand variables. (For example, changes in inflation
might cause changes in deficits, rather than vice versa.) There are two
ways to correct for this: simple one-year lags on the deficit variables (which
are reported in the middle panels), or formal instrumental variables (I.V.)
estimation. The lower left panels report the results of I.V. tests where the
instrument set is rather large. The uniformly poor results in these tables is
most likely due to the problem of “over-identified” instruments, which is
particularly problematic with extremely small samples such as those used
here [see Nelson and Startz, 1990]-especially the total-government
measures. Therefore, I.V. tests with more limited instrument sets are
performed, with results reported in the lower-right panel of each table.
A third reason to suspect that the simple regressions are
inappropriate applies specifically to the two GDP growth equations. Since
each of the deficit measures has current nominal GDP in the denominator,
and the change in current real GDP is the endogenous variable, this
creates a possible built-in tendency for the coefficient of the deficit variable
to be negative (inasmuch as nominal and real GDP are correlated with
each other). Thus, the lagged tests and, in particular, the I.V. tests will be
crucial for testing and verifying relationships between deficits and real
GDP growth.
page 56Since the analysis of each of the four basic equations is very similar, I
will explain in some detail only the results of the regressions for the
inflation equation. Following that, I will summarize the results and
conclusions for the other three equations, based on the three criteria noted
above.
OLS Regressions With Contemporaneous and Lagged Deficits
In the upper-left panel of Table 5,4s the t-statistics for the deficit
variables show no general pattern as one moves from cruder to more
sophisticated measures. For federal-only measures, moving from OBD to
KPAHEDF (and, for reasons noted previously, setting DDGDPx aside)
makes things marginally worse with the notable exception of PAHEDF,
which has the only t-statistic which is significant at the 95% level. For total
government measures, moving from UDT to HEDT makes matters worse,
but the move to PAHEDT again provides coefficients which are significant
at the 95% level; KPAHEDT slightly weakens the results, although the
coefficient is still significant. In general, then, the PAHEDx regressions
give the strongest results, as would expected. The relative strength of the
federal-only measures over the total-government measures is mixed,
however, with only two of the five pairs (omitting, here as subsequently, the
KLPAHEDx  pair) dominated by the total-government measure. This is not,
of course, what the theory discussed previously would lead one to expect.
In the same equation, but with the deficit variable lagged by one year
(the middle-left panel of the table), the federal-only results are uniformly
low. The t-statistics fall as the deficit measure becomes more sophisticated,
43 The verbal descriptions of regression results will only discuss the OLS
regressions, since the AR(l) regressions are provided only for the interested reader.
page 57from OBD to UDF and HEDF; and although the absolute values then rise
(while staying quite low in absolute terms) with PAHEDF and KPAHEDF,
the sign of KPAHEDF is reversed. The most significant form of the total-
government deficits is KPAHEDT, although HEDT and PAHEDT are also
each significant at the 95% level. In this case, however, all five pairings
show the total-government measure with a much higher t-statistic than the
federal-only measure.
Instrumental Variables
The instrumental variables estimates are reported in the lower
panels of Table 5. While the larger set of instruments (as expected) did not
provide statistical significance (except in one case, KPAHEDT), the limited
set of instruments made the results less significant as often as it improved
them. For the full instrument set, the federal-only variable with the
highest t-statistic is HEDF, which is higher than PAHEDF’s, but of the
opposite sign. For the limited instrument set, PAHEDF is the top
performer.
The total-government deficit measures are led by KPAHEDT in both
panels, with the relationships between UDT, HEDT, PAHEDT, and
KPAHEDT following no useful pattern except that PAHEDT has a higher t-
statistic than HEDT in both panels. For the full instrument set, the total-
government equations are better than the federal-only measures in three of
five cases, while they are better in all five cases for the limited instrument
set.
Regarding the expected sign of the coefficient on the deficit variables,
the results are mixed, but generally argue against the theoretical concern
that deficits are inflationary. While a few results have positive coefficients
on the deficit variables (reflected in the tables by positive t-statistics), none of
page 58those t-statistics are significant. For the most significant estimates,
moreover, the signs are negative, indicating that higher deficits cause
lower inflation-not higher inflation. This extremely counter-intuitive
result will be tested again in the VAR and IRF results reported below.
OtherEquation@
UNEMPLOYMENT: Table 6 reports the results of the thirteen
regressions which attempt to explain changes in the unemployment rate as
a function of the deficit and lagged changes in the real exchange rate. The
equations which used contemporaneous values of the deficit measures
performed uniformly poorly,45 while the regressions with lagged deficit
measures had very significant t-statistics in a large number of cases. The
I.V. results were not as strong as for the lagged deficits, but the limited
instrument set was generally stronger than the full instrument set.
There was only modest improvement as the measures became more
sophisticated; and there was, contrary to expectations, a general pattern of
federal-only measures outperforming total-government measures.
The signs of virtually all of the coefficients are negative, confirming
the theoretical benefit of deficits, i.e., higher deficits lead to decreases-or,
at least, to smaller increases-in unemployment.
GDP GROWTH: Table 7 reports the results of the thirteen
44 For all three remaining equations, the values of R-bar2 (not reported on the
tables) are in many cases quite low-on the order of 0.01 to 0.05. Even so, analysis of the t-
statistics of the deficit variables is useful.
45 The notable exceptions are the DDGDPx variables, which showed
significant results on Tables 6, 7, and 8 only for the upper panels, with very insignificant
results for lagged and I.V. equations.
page 59regressions which attempt to explain changes in GDP growth as a function
of the deficit and lagged changes in the real exchange rate. Only DDGDPx
estimates have significant results for the equations with contemporaneous
values of the deficit measures. In the lagged deficit equations, while
PAHEDF had the highest t-statistic among federal-only measures, the
overall highest result was for UDT, among the crudest of measures. The
I.V. results were all very weak.
More sophisticated measures showed generally stronger results for
the federal-only but not for the total-government measures, with the latter
group being mixed. Once again, the federal-only measures outperformed
the total-government measures in a bare majority of cases, although this
set of theoretical anomalies included the especially important comparison
of PAHEDF and PAHEDT.
The very significant negative signs of the DDGDPx measures in the
upper panels should not be taken too seriously, however, since the built-in
bias toward negative coefficients is at work here. (Indeed, in the non-
contemporaneous regressions, the coefficients for those two measures are
insignificant and, with one exception, positive.) In the other panels,
although very few of the t-statistics are significant, the signs of the deficit
coefficients are almost all positive, again lending some support to the
theoretical benefit of deficits, i.e., higher deficits lead to higher GDP
growth.
Table 8 reports the results of the thirteen regressions which attempt
to explain changes in the unemployment rate as a function of the deficit
and lagged changes in the monetary base. The results do not differ in any
notable way from the results in the previous growth equation. More
sophisticated measures do not outperform cruder measures, federal-only
page 60measures generally outperform total-government measures, PAHEDF is
the strongest variable in lagged and I.V. equations, and the signs of the
deficit coefficients tend to confirm the theory.
C. Vector Autore~ions and Impulse! Response F’unctions
Table 9 presents the results of vector autoregressions and impulse
response functions for the thirteen deficit measures in models with the
following variables (each with two lags): change in the real monetary base,
percentage change in GDP, inflation (as measured by the annual
percentage change in the implicit GDP deflator), and short-term interest
rates (the discount rate on three-month U.S. Treasury Bills). This follows
the method in Eisner and Pieper [1992].
For each of the deficit measures, I report the significance level of the
F-statistic for the deficit variable (testing whether the coefficients on both
lags of the deficit are zero) in regressions against the two target variables,
GDP growth and inflation. [Note: Lower significance levels imply stronger
results.] Also, seven-year time path responses of the five variables, based
on an impulse of one percentage point increase in the deficit (measured as
a percentage of GDP) are shown.
GDP GROWTH: For the GDP growth variable, the deficit measure
with the best F-statistic is OBD, the crudest measure. Moving to UDF,
HEDF, PAHEDF, and KPAHEDF does not produce a uniform change in the
F-statistics, and HEDF is the only other deficit measure with a significance
level below 0.2. HEDT to is the most significant total-government deficit
measure, and moving from HEDT to PAHEDT to KPAHEDT shows a
general increase in significance levels, rather than the hoped-for decrease.
Again, the federal-only measures seem to dominate the total-government
page 61Despite monetary policy being generally accommodative, based on the
time paths of AMB, the growth of GDP turns negative for periods 3 through
5 or longer in virtually every case. However, while the negative GDP
growth might tend to support some versions of the crowding out story, the
upturn in GDP growth for the later years (especially for PAHEDx)
somewhat offsets this. The IRF’s, therefore, lead to contradictory
conclusions about the connections between deficits and growth.
INFLATION: For the inflation variable, HEDT and UDF have
the two best significance levels for their F-statistics. PAHEDF has the
worst result of all, while even the OBD measure is demonstrably stronger.
For total-government measures, HEDT again outperforms everything,
including PAHEDT, which theoretically should perform best. Unlike
nearly all prior results, however, the total-government measures are much
stronger than the federal-only measures.
Although many of the deficit measures show a time path of inflation
that is mixed in sign, both HEDT and PAHEDT show inflation falling very
consistently after the deficit impulse. Thus, although the evidence is
somewhat mixed, the suggestion is again that the increase in the deficit is,
if anything, anti-inflationary (and in any case not demonstrably
inflationary).
46 The usefulness of the total-government measures in VAR’s is highly
questionable due to the small samples. Each of the VAR regressions with HEDT,
PAHEDT, and KPAHEDT have only 8 degrees of freedom. Even so, in some cases the
total-government measures had lower significance levels than other measures.
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The overall results that are of most interest can be summarized in
the categories of “HEDx us. PAHEDx,” best federal-only measure, best total-
government measure, best overall measure, and the comparative results of
paired federal-only and total-government measures. These comparisons
can be made among all twenty-six empirical tests (six different
specifications for each of four different equations, along with two VAR
comparisons), among the twenty-four empirical tests excluding the VAR’s,
among the sixteen OLS regressions, and among the eight lagged and
limited-I.V. regressions (which tended to have the stronger results).
Since the VAR results were very different from the rest, however,
they should be summarized separately. In both cases, HEDx gave better
results than PAHEDx; the federal-only measures were dominated by OBD
and UDF, while the total-government measures were dominated by HEDT;
and the best overall result was given by OBD in one case and HEDT in the
other. Very little support is given to the supposed primacy of PAHEDx
measures in these results.
Among the non-VAR results, however, the most notable result is the
strong confirmation of Eisner’s conclusion that PAHEDF provides better
statistical results than does HEDF. This is true in all but one of the twenty-
four regression comparisons, the only exception being a full-I.V.
regression. To the contrary, though, HEDT held its own against PAHEDT,
evenly splitting the eight lagged and limited-I.V. regressions.
The strongest federal measure was overwhelmingly PAHEDF, which
dominated in 13 of 24 panels and, more significantly, in 11 of 16 OLS
regressions and 7 of 8 lagged and limited-I.V. regressions. The total-
government side, however, had much less clear-cut results, with UDT and
page 63KPAHEDT performing as well as or better than PAHEDT in each of the sub-
groupings.
The best overall results were also split. Roughly half of each sub-
grouping was dominated by PAHEDF, with the other half split between
UDT and KPAHEDT. Significantly, PAHEDT was never the strongest
overall measure of the fiscal deficit.
Finally, the comparisons of each pair of measures (UDF and UDT,
DDGDPF and DDGDPT, etc.) showed a consistently narrow advantage to
the federal-only measures, no matter how narrow the sub-grouping. For
all 26 tests, with five pairings in each (again, ignoring KLPAHEDx), there
were 130 comparisons; and the federal-only measure was more significant
in 69 cases. In the 120 non-VAR comparisons, federal-only measures won
64 direct comparisons; 43 of 80 OLS tests; 22 of 40 lagged and limited I.V.
tests; and 12 out of 20 lagged pairings. Among just the PAHEDx
comparisons, moreover, PAHEDF had higher diagnostic statistics even
more frequently-roughly two-thirds of the cases showed PAHEDT
performing worse than PAHEDF. There was clearly no consistent
advantage gained by including the state and local sector in the calculation
of the fiscal deficit.
. v. co_
The weaknesses in the official debt and deficit accounts, and the
purported harms of deficits, have brought forth useful analyses of what
deficit measures are best and what harms-or benefits-actually occur as
a result of deficit spending. However, for at least some of the potential uses
to which deficit measures might be put, there is a disappointing divergence
page 64between what is theoretically “best” and what performs best in empirical
tests. While one can tentatively conclude that, at least for the specifications
tested here, careful adjustment of deficit measures for cyclical factors and
price effects does generally improve the statistical explanatory power of
federal-only deficits, the inclusion of state and local accounts actually
degrades the results.
Overall, the empirical conclusion must be that, if theoretically better
deficit measures are empirically more useful, the specifications that will
demonstrate this are yet to be tested. Still, however, if one had to choose a
single measure of the deficit for empirical testing, these results argue (in a
way that is, admittedly, not overwhelming) for using PAHEDF.
This is not to say that the improvement of deficit measures is
pointless. Since much of the analysis of deficits is done simply to answer
the question of whether we are currently running a surplus or a deficit
(and, by implication, whether we need to cut spending or raise taxes), policy
conclusions independent of these regression results are still at stake.
The separation of government accounts into appropriately-measured
capital and operating accounts is also, in and of itself, useful. For, while it
ought to be obvious that spending decisions by any economic agent should be
made on the basis of alternative costs and benefits, the related policy lesson
is constantly being re-learned: deficit spending is not presumptively bad; it
is only bad when it replaces something better. This is understandably
difficult if one believes that the actual deficit spending in the nineteen
eighties was a long series of mistakes. Even if that is true, however, these
mistakes are sunk costs; what remains is to learn the right lessons from
our experience.
Finally, it is crucial to point out that both OBD and UDF, the two most
page 65commonly discussed measures of the deficit, are not only crudely measured
but performed especially poorly in virtually all of the empirical
comparisons reported above. Therefore, it should be clear that their














KPAHEDF 0.752 0.695 0.735 0.585 0.568 0.909





0.857 0.862 0.927 1.000
0.859 0.816 0.908 0.975 1.000
0.859 0.822 0.748 0.615 0.596 l.OOC
0.804 0.670 0.732 0.567 0.620 0.877
0.812 0.742 0.767 0.636 0.637 0.938
0.732 0.607 0.716 0.549 0.585 0.846
0.161 0.193 0.083 0.070 0.066 0.169





0.019 0.116 0.024 0.086 -0.020 1.000
0.018 0.112 0.023 0.083 -0.020 1.000 1.000
kmlple penod: lYl&Yd. source:.4u~nors  esmnaces.
Table 4: Correlation ~Matrix for Chances in Thirteen Deficit Measareg
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OBD 1.000
UDF 0.992 1.000
UDT 0.897 0.907 1.000
DDGDPF 0.683 0.678 0.831 1.000
DDGDPT 0.613 0.604 0.765 0.976 1.000
HEDF 0.784 0.780 0.570 0.291 0.194 1.000
HEDT 0.769 0.748 0.576 0.316 0.252 0.938 1.000
PAHEDF 0.626 0.630 0.505 0.301 0.185 0.872 0.775 1.000
PAHEDT 0.602 0.596 0.492 0.283 0.174 0.845 0.624 0.970 1.000,
KPAHEDF 0.572 0.580 0.455 0.253 0.133 0.850) 0.754 0.987 0.963 1.000
KP.L\HEDT 0.535 0.534 0.432 0.223 0.108 0.815 0.792 0.949 0.984 0.970 1.000
KLP.4HEDF 0,321 0.315 0.244 0.154 0.166 0.328 0.231 0.223 0.172 0.192 0.139 1.000
KLP,4HEDT 0.321 0.315 0.244 0.154 0.166 0.328 0.231 0.222 0.172 0.192 0.139 1.0@u -.Li.” ’ i:illj I
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Instrumental Variables: INFt 7 bo + blINFt_l + t&U, + b3DEFICITt









2 Least S&ares with Cochrane-Or&t AR(l) correction
3 Two-Stage Least Squares, full instrument set
4 Two-Stage Least Squares, limited instrument set I
Bold indicates highest t-statistic tin absolute value) among estimates in the same column,
excluding KLPAHEDF and KLPAHEDT.
Sample period: 1967-93, annual data, except for HEDT, PAHEDT, and KPAHEDT,  which
have sample period 1973-93, and KLPAHEDF, which has sample period 1971-93.
DDGDPF and DDGDPI’ are calendar years; all others are fiscal years.
INF = inflation (percentage change in implicit GDP deflator)
U = Unemployment rate (number unemployed as a percentage of the total labor force j I
DEFICIT zone of thirteen measures of the government deficit





































































































































Instrumental Variables: AUt = bo + blAEm4 +
Federal- Total- Federal-
Only t Government t Only t
Deficit stati- Deficit stati- Deficit stati-
Measure stic3 Measure stic3 Measure stic4
OBD -0.54 OBD -1.57
UDF -0.53 UDT -0.67 UDF -1.52
DDGDPF 0.02 DDGDPT 0.47 DDGDPF -0.43
HEDF -1.27 HEDT -0.67 HEDF -1.91
P.-F -1.78 PAHEDT - 1.03 PAHEDF -2.32
Kl’.4HEDF - 1.19 KPAHEDT -1.11 KPAHEDF -1.56













Least Squares with Cochrane-Orcutt AR(l) correction
Two-Stage Least Squares, full instrument set _. _ .
Two-Stage Least Squares, limited instrument set
lold indicates highest t-statistic (in absolute value) among estimates in the same column,
excluding KLPAHEDF and KLPAHEDT.
ample period: 1967-93, annual data, except for HEDT, PAHEDT, and KPAHEDT, which
have sample period 1973-93, and KLPAHEDF,  which has sample period 1971-93.
DDGDPF and DDGDPI’ are calendar years; all others are fiscal years.
U = annual change in unemployment rate
EE..E = annual change in real exchange rate
IEFICIT zone  of thirteen measures of the government deficit
ource: _kthor’s regressions.. . l .
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Lagged Deficit: %AGDPt = bo + blAERJ&~  + bgDEFICITt_l
YY
’ Federal- Totai- i
Only t Government t
Deficit stati- Deficit stati-
Measure sticl Measure stjcl
OBD 1.39
UDF 1.56 UDT 2.04
DDGDPF 0.83 DDGDPI’ 0.42
HEDF 1.54 HEDT 1.19
PAFIEDF 1.90 PAHEDT 1.16
KPAHEDF 0.52 KPAHEDT 0.83




















Instrumental Variables: %AGDPt :
















L Ordinary Least Squares _--II 1.47 IIKLPAHEDFI-1.13  1 1 KLPAHEDT - 1.03
I
2 Least Squares with Cochrane-Orcutt AR(l) correction
3 Two-Staee  Least Squares, full instrument set
,0.22 DDGDPF 0.67 DDGDPT 0.11
0.14 HEDF 1.11 HEDT 0.82
0.41 PAHEDF 1.83 PAFIEDT 0.91



















q b. + b1AERRt_4 + b2DEFICITt
hh- Federal-
II UDF IO.45 1 1 UDT IO.%
4 Two-Stage Least S&ares, limited instrument set
Bold indicates highest t-statistic (in absolute value) among estimates in the same column.
excluding KLPAHEDF and KLPAHEDT.
Sample period: 1967-93, annual data, except for HEDT, PAHEDT, and KPAHEDT, which
have sample period 1973-93, and KLPAHEDF, which has sample period 1971-93.
DDGDPF and DDGDPT are calendar years; all others are fiscal years.
%AGDP = percentage change in annual real GDP
AERR = annual change in real exchange rate
DEFICIT zone of thirteen measures of the government deficit
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Lagged Deficit: %AG ;=bo + b 1AMBt-1 + b2DEFICITt_l
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Two-Stage Least Squares, full instrument set
4 Two-Stage Least Squares, limited instrument set
Bold indicates highest t-statistic (in absolute value) among estimates in the same column.
excluding KLPAHEDF and KLPAHEDT.
Sample period: 1967-93, annual data, except for HEDT, PAHEDT, and  KPfI.HEDT,  which
have sample period 1973-93, and KLPAHEDF, which has sample period 1971-93.
DDGDPF and DDGDPT are calendar years; ail others are fiscal years.
%AGDP = percentage change in annual real GDP
AMB = change in real monetary base as a percentage of real GDP
DEFICIT zone of thirteen measures of the government deficit
Source: Author’s regressions. I L.
Vectorgyltore~ns
. -Bt&gt D&&J&2 . Base. QQP. wst Rm
VA% with 2 Lags, orderings: Deficit, MBCH, %AGDP, INF, RSHORT. Impulse response
functions to one percentage point shock in deficit variable.
&kIB = change in rea.I monetary base, measured in percent of real GDP.
%AGDP = annual percentage change in real GDP, expressed in percent.
INF = inflation, annual percentage change in implicit GDP deff ator, expressed in percent.
RSHORT  = interest rate on 3-month U.S. Treasury Bills, expressed in percent per annum.
OBD
Year DEFICIT AMB %AGDP
0 1.000 0.000 0.000
1 0.376 0.009 0.275
2 0.315 0.031 -0.612
3 0.301 0.021 -0.348
4 0.181 0.003 -0.276
5 0.172 0.005 -0.156
6 0.103 0.003 -0.091
7 0.073 0.001 -0.064
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation
with %AGDP as dependent variable:
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation
with INF as dependent variable:
UDF
Year DEFICIT A.MB %AGDP
0 1.000 0.000 0.000
1 0.283 0.016 0.324
2 0.155 0.029 -0.581
3 0.204 0.018 -0.287
4 0.122 -0.001 -0.324
5 0.177 0.006 -0.143
6 0.096 0.005 -0.017
7 0.063 0.003 0.00 1
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
VariabIe (with one and two lags) in equation
with %AGDP as dependent variable:
Significance LeveI of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation
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UDT
Year DEFICIT AMB %AGDP
0 1.000 0.000 0.000
1 0.450 0.018 0.134
2 0.171 0.046 -0.348
3 0.109 0.030 -0.199
4 0.138 0.002 -0.262
5 0.166 -0.002 -0.301
6 0.125 0.004 -0.249
7 0.053 0.005 -0.112
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation
with %AGDP as dependent variable:
Significance LeveI of F-statistic for Deficit
VariabIe (with one and two lags) in equation
with INF as dependent variable:
DDGDPF
Year DEFICIT AMB %AGDP
0 1.000 0.000 0.000
1 0.644 0.051 -0.348
2 -0.086 0.041 0.643
3 -0.23 7 0.004 0.212
4 -0.047 -0.022 -0.409
5 0.144 -0.020 -0.566
6 0.040 -0.005 -0.166
7 -0.126 -0.005 0.123
Significance Level of F-statistic for Dericic
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation
with ?&GDP as dependent variable:
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation
with INF as dependent variable:
DDGDPT
Year DEFICIT AMB %AGDP
0 1.000 0.000 0.000
1 0.782 0.048 -0.417
2 -0.056 0.051 0.535
3 -0.207 0.012 0.260
4 0.053 -0.016 -0.371
5 0.259 -0.017 -0.626
6 0.073 -0.002 -0.238
7 -0.176 0.000 0.095
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
VariabIe (with one and two lags) in equation
with %AGDP as dependent variable:
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation




































Year DEFICIT AMB %AGDP
0 1.000 0.000 0.000
1 0.229 0.016 0.159
2 -0.055 0.011 -0.894
3 0.005 0.012 -0.541
4 -0.050 0.006 -0.352
5 0.070 0.013 0.114
6 0.061 0.006 0.230
7 0.077 -0.001 0.109
Significance LeveI of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two Iags) in equation
with %AGDP as dependent variable:
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation
with INF as dependent vari.able:
HEDT
Year DEFICIT AMB %AGDP
0 1.000 0.000 $000
1 0.069 0.030 0.470
2 -0.285 0.057 -2.234
3 0.174 0.031 -0.572
4 0.187 -0.010 -0.027
5 0.144 0.048 0.171
6 0.162 0.044 0.148
7 0.241 0.023 0.429
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation
with %AGDP as dependent variable:
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation
with INF as dependent variable:
PAHEDF
Year DEFICIT AMB %AGDP
0 1.000 0.000 0.000
1 0.287 0.025 0.214
2 -0.286 0.001 -0.856
3 -0.185 0.001 -0.726
4 -0.02 1 0.007 -0.315
5 0.155 0.020 0.338
6 0.150 0.011 0.402
7 0.099 -0.001 0.127
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation
with %AGDP as dependent variable:
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation











































0 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 0.365 0.069 0.266 -0.579
2 -0.179 0.036 -1.800 -0.707
3 0.141 0.005 -0.790 -0.004
4 0.321 0.003 -0.262 -0.201
5 0.378 0.059 0.372 -0.803
6 0.307 0.042 0.301 -0.889










Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation
with %AGDP as dependent variable:
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation






















Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation
with %AGDP as dependent variable:
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation
with INF as dependent variable:
KPAHEDT
Year DEFICIT AMB %AGDP
0 1.000 0.000 0.000
1 0.637 0.042 0.343
2 0.339 0.030 -1.184
3 0.419 0.008 -0.886
4 0.530 0.014 -0.75 1
5 0.681 0.057 0.007
6 0.651 0.047 0.262





















Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation
with %AGDP as dependent variable:
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation
with INF as dependent variable:
0.673
0.058ELPAHEDF
Year DEFICIT AMB. %AGDP
0 1.000~ 0.000 0.000
1 -0.448 0.000 0.014
2 0.315 0.000 -0.017
3 0.190 0.000 -0.006
4 -0.413 0.000 0.002
5 0.426 0.000 0.000
6 -0.043 0.000 0.010
7 -0.073 0.000 0.000
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation
with %AGDP as dependent variable:
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two Iags) in equation
with INF as dependent variable:
KLPAHEDT
Year DEFICIT AMB %AGDP
0 1.000 0.000 0.000
1 -0.478 0.000 0.012
2 0.425 0.000 -0.018
3 0.101 0.000 -0.002
4 -0.560 0.000 -0.001
5 0.510 0.000 -0.001
6 -0.224 0.000 0.014
7 0.054 0.000 0.000
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation
with %AGDP as dependent variable:
Significance Level of F-statistic for Deficit
Variable (with one and two lags) in equation
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